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I. INTRODUCTION
Our insanity defense jurisprudence is the prisoner of a combination
of empirical myths and social meta-myths.' Born of a medievalist,
fundamentalist religious vision of the roots of mental illness and the
relationships between mental illness, crime, and punishment,2 the
myths continue to dominate the landscape in spite of impressive and
ample scientific and behavioral evidence to the contrary.3
A further prisoner of the powerful symbols at play in any criminal
trial where lack of responsibility is raised as a defense,4 the legal sys-
1. See Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense
Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. Res. L. Rev. 599 (1989-90). By meta-myths, I refer to
myths that have devloped about and around the empirical myths. See id. at 603-
07, 713-31. See infra text following note 10. For a parallel explanation, see V.
FOLEY, A INTRODUCTION TO FAMILY THERAPY 74-75 (1974)(explaining metacom-
munication theory).
2. See M. Perlin, Mental Illness, Crime, and the Culture of Punishment (unpub-
lished paper in progress). See generally J. BIGGS, TaE GuILTY MIND (1955); A.
GoLDsTEiN, THE INsANITY DEFENSE (1967); J. NEAMAN, SUGGESTION OF THE
DEVIL: THE ORIGINS OF MADNESS (1975).
3. See, e.g., Crowe, Genetic Studies of Antisocial Personality and Related Disorders,
in CnrricAL IssuEs I PsYcmATmic DISORDERS 193 (. Spitzer & D. Klein eds.
1978); Garber, Weilburg, Buonanno, Manschreck & New, Use of Magnetic
Resonance Imaging in Psychiatry, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 164 (1988); Rogers, Se-
man & Clark, Assessment of Criminal Responsibility: Initial Validation of the
R-CRAS with the M'Naghten and GBMI Standards, 9 INTL J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 67
(1986); R. Rogers, Assessment of Criminal Responsibility. Empirical Advances
and Unanswered Questions (paper presented at national conference of the Amer-
ican Psychological Association, August 1985).
4. See, e.g., Herman, The Insanity Defense in Fact and Fictioru On Norval Morris's
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tem rejects the psychodynamic view of human motivation and behav-
ior5 and remains intensely suspicious of concepts of mental health and
mental disability, of mental health professionals, and of the ability of
such professionals to assess or ameliorate mental disability.6 As a re-
sult, the legal system remains most comfortable with an all-or-nothing
view of mental illness7 and a substantive test for criminal responsibil-
ity that most closely resembles the so-called "wild beast" test of 1724.8
It is no wonder that in the aftermath of the Hinckley acquittal, Con-
gress adopted a substantive insanity defense responsibility test that es-
tablished a more restrictive version of the 1843 M'Naghten right and
wrong test.9
We retain our allegiance to the underlying meta-myths that but-
tress the discredited but still powerful empirical myths about the in-
sanity defense. Some of those myths include misconceptions about the
defense's overuse, its use only in the most heinous of cases, its relative
success rate, and the length and conditions of custodial confinement of
Madness and the Criminal Law, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 385; Keilitz, Re-
searching and Reforming the Insanity Defense, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 289 (1987);
Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense - Not Yet, 26 RUTGERs L. REV. 719
(1973).
5. For the paradigmatic case, see State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 210 A.2d 193 (1965), in
particular id. at 463, 210 A.2d at 204 (1965)(Weintraub, C.J., concurring).
6. See, e-g., Perlin, The Supreme Court the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant
and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or "Doctrinal
Abyss"? 29 ARIz. L. REV. 1 (1987); Roth, Preserve But Limit the Insanity Defense,
58 PSYCHIATRY Q. 91 (1986-87).
7. See, e-g., Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945)("An of-
fender is wholly sane or wholly insane"); Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d
542, 552 (1982)('For the purposes of guilt determination, an offender is either
wholly sane or wholly insane"). On the practical problems raised by this either/
or construct, see N. FINKEL, INSANITY ON TRIAL 145-46 (1988)(discussing self-per-
ceived dilemma of Hinckley jurors).
8. Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724), in 16 T.B. HOWELL, A COMPLETE COL-
LECTION OF STATE TRIALs 695 (1812)(insanity acquittal proper where A "is totally
deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing,
no more than a brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never the object of punish-
ment"); Roberts, Golding & Finctam, Implicit Theories of Criminal Responsibil-
ity Decision Making and the Insanity Defense, 11 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 207
(1987). Although the emphasis in Arnold was probably meant to focus on lack of
intellectual ability (as opposed to the violent "ravenous" image it now evokes, see
Ray, Criminal Law of Insanity, 28 AM. JURIST 253,257 (1985)), the image remains
a profound one, and the test has stood as "a significant archetype in the history of
law and medicine." Platt & Diamond, The Origins and Development of the "Wild
Beast" Concept of Mental Illness and Its Relations to Theories of Criminal Re-
sponsibility, 1 J. HIST. BEHAv. Sci. 355, 365 (1965). Compare Penry v. Lynaugh,
109 S. Ct. 2934, 2954 (1989)(citing Arnold in discussion of common law ban on
persons who had a "total lack of reason or understanding").
9. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 638-40 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1988) and the impact
of the Hinckley trial on its adoption). Cf M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200(1843). See generally 3 M. PERLIN, MENTAL DIsABILnT LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMI-
NAL §§ 15.35-15.42 (1989).
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those few defendants who are able to successfully use the defense.
The meta-myths are four-fold:o (1) the defense is regularly, easily,
and successfully feigned (a dissimulation purportedly eagerly abetted
by unscrupulous defense lawyers and disreputable forensic witnesses);
(2) unlike physiological illness, mental illness is invisible and this in-
visibility renders the diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment of mental ill-
ness less objective than the parallel techniques employed in other
medical specialities; (3) if a criminal defendant does not comport with
popular visual images of "craziness" which are based upon distorted
media depictions, religious iconography, and unconscious rationaliza-
tions, judges or jurors will not be satisfied that the pertinent substan-
tive responsibility standard is met; and (4) mental illness is not an
appropriately exculpatory legal excuse because it demands an evalua-
tion of behavior beyond that which is readily perceivable at a con-
scious level. The longevity of the empirical myths cannot be placed in
proper perspective as long as we wilfully turn a blind eye to the exist-
ence of these social myths.
In this article, I recast the question: Why do these myths persist in
spite of the best scientific, behavioral, and social science research to
the contrary? In formulating an answer, I turn first to what I charac-
terize as the behavioral roots of insanity defense decisionmaking. In
Part II, I carefully examine two topics: 1) the way reasoning devices
that help shape our daily behavior, known as simplifying heuristics,
lead to distorted and systematically erroneous decisions when applied
to legal problemsll and 2) the meaning of "ordinary common sense"
(OCS) in jurisprudential developments.' 2 I suggest that until we come
to grips with the power that these processes have over us we cannot
begin to understand why the insanity defense myths have persisted,
what values retention of the myths reinforce, why these myths be-
come even more powerful in a case such as Hinckley where the victim
was an archetypal patriarch, and why these myths continue to hold
our legal system in thrall.13
In Part III, two important bodies of recently-burgeoning research
about jury behavior and social science evidence are examined to illu-
10. See, e.g., Jeffrey, Pasewark & Bieber, Insanity Plea: Predicting Not Guilty By
Reason of Insanity Adjudications, 16 BULL. AM. AcAD. PsYCHIATRY & L. 35
(1988); Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL
L. REv. 777 (1985); Pogrebin, Regoli & Perry, Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity: A
Research Note, 8 INT'L J. L. & PsYcHiATRY 237 (1986); Rodriguez, LeWinn & Per-
lin, The Insanity Defense Under Siege: Legislative Assaults and Legal Rejoinders,
14 RUTGERS L.J. 397 (1983). The meta-myths are discussed extensively in Perlin,
supra note 1, at 713-31.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 46-90, focusing on such principles as the "viv-
idness" effect and attribution theory.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 91-133.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 134-85.
[Vol. 69:3
INSANITY DEFENSE
minate the extent to which jurors actually apply the controlling law in
insanity defense cases, the extent to which jury nullification occurs,14
and the remarkable ambivalence with which courts treat social science
evidence, and how such evidence frequently appears to be admitted
only when it conforms with a judge's "ordinary common sense."' 5 I
then draw on these bodies of research in an effort to "read" the signals
given by judges, mostly United States Supreme Court justices, in rele-
vant cases and to determine whether their views are anything more
than a reflection of what philosophers and jurisprudence scholars
have come to call "conventional morality."' 6 Here, I give special at-
tention to the positions taken by Chief Justice Rehnquist.17
In Part IV, I conclude that the results of these bodies of research
make sense only when viewed as the by-product of the sort of pre-
reflective thought embodied by OCS and heuristic reasoning devices.
These devices are largely unknown to lawyers and other legal deci-
sionmakers, but remain enormously important factors that shape our
insanity defense jurisprudence, especially when reflected in a case
such as the Hinckley acquittal. Until we acknowledge their existence,
their pervasiveness, and their domination of our thought and reason-
ing processes, we will not be able to formulate a reflective and inte-
grated jurisprudence of the insanity defense.
II. PSYCHODYNAMICS AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE:
PIERCING THE VEIL OF CONSCIOUSNESS
A. Introduction
It is not enough to merely assert that insanity defense mythology is
persistent and impervious to scientific developments, philosophical
reasoning, and empirical discoveries. We must inquire into the unique
roots of the implacability of public opinion in this area of the law.
Many of these myths have their roots in theology, in medieval super-
stition, in concepts of "masks" and "magic."18 It is necessary to ex-
plore beyond these fairly rudimentary drives and motivations if we are
to ferret out the true meaning of why our insanity defense jurispru-
dence has developed the way it has.
Our further attention must be focused on at least three sets of addi-
tional phenomena: 1) the singular way in which "wrong verdicts"
bring immediate calls for the abolition of the insanity defense in a way
that "wrong" verdicts based on self-defense, alibi, or mistake do not
inspire public outcries for the abolition of those defenses; 2) the use of
14. See infra text accompanying notes 186-253.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 254-96.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 297-349.
17. See iqfra text accompanying notes 297-306, 325-34.
18. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 673-88.
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heuristic thinking and behavior theory as an explanation for such
decisionmaking; and 3) the role of "ordinary common sense" in
decisionmaking.19
B. The Significance of "Wrong" Verdicts
Over 80 years ago in a railroad case, Justice Holmes wrote that
"great cases like hard cases make bad law" because of "some accident
of immediate, overwhelming interest which appeals to feelings and
distorts the judgment."20 According to Holmes, these "immediate in-
terests" exercise a kind of "hydraulic pressure which makes what pre-
viously was clear seem doubtful and before which even well settled
principles of law will bend."21
So it is with insanity defense cases. The call for abolition of the
insanity defense followed quickly the "strafing of the cuckoo's nest"22
in the Hinckley case.23 In responding to the "hydraulic pressure" of
19. In M. Perlin, Authoritarianism, The Mystique of Ronald Reagan, and the Future
of the Insanity Defense; and Moral Development Psychology and Insanity De-
fense Policy: Moral Judgments and Immoral Jurisprudence (unpublished papers
in progress), I discuss the unique psychodynamic importance of the attack by
John Hinckley on Ronald Reagan, the perfect "father figure." Then, I consider
the moral bases of insanity decisionmaking by focusing on (1) the importance of
the authoritarian personality style, (2) the roles of politics, the media, and public
opinion, (3) the unique and important parallels between insanity defense and
death penalty decisionmaking, and (4) the impact of moral psychology on such
decisionmaking.
20. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904). See also P. DEVLIN,
TRIAL BY JURY 124 (1966):
Hard cases make bad law; the jury is sometimes too frightened of the
hard case and the judge of the bad law. This is the eternal conflict be-
tween law in the abstract and the justice of the case - how to do what is
best in the individual case and yet preserve the rule. It is out of this
dialect that the just verdict comes.
Cf. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987)(constitutional law
tends to define itself through reaction to "great cases").
21. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904). See Morse, supra
note 10, at 779 ("Unpopular or even 'wrong' verdicts occur in all areas of law,
however, and should not spur intemperate attempts to change fundamentally just
laws"). But see Shah, Criminal Responsibility, in FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY AND
PSYCHOLOGY: PERSPECTIVES AND STANDARDS FOR INTERDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE
167, 200 (W. Curran, A. McGarry & S. Shah eds. 1986):
There is also reason for concern that the shocking cases tend to have
a very disproportionate influence in shaping public policies and related
practices. Notorious cases seem in many instances to function like the
proverbial tails that tend to wag and influence policies [that affect] the
much larger (albeit less visible) class of people.
22. English, The Light Between Twilight and Dusk Federal Criminal Law and the
Volitional Insanity Defense, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 10 (1988).
23. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 637-40. For a superb literary account of the Hinckley
trial, see L. CAPLAN, THE INsANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCK-
LEY, JR. (1984).
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public opinion2 4 and by "overreacting to a single astonishing inci-
dent,"2 5 it replicated26 similar calls which have followed almost every
unpopular insanity verdict since the M'Naghten trial.2 7 These calls re-
flected a tenuous logic: "if the verdict was wrong, then the standard
[must have been] wrong."28
While the "bad case" phenomenon has been noted,2 9 there appears
24. See R. Christiansen, From Hadfield to Hinckley- The Insanity Plea in Politically-
Related Trials 46 (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Academy of
Criminal Justice Sciences, March, 22, 1983).
25. Kaufman, Should Florida Follow the Federal Insanity Defense? 15 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 793,836 (1987). See also Herman, supra note 4, at 393 ("In the wake of such
traumatic events [as political assassination and assassination attempts], public
opinion cannot be measured reliably. Comment on the insanity defense now is
not likely to be a reaction to the insanity defense in general but rather to its
operation in the exceptional case of John Hinckley").
26. Cf. Tighe, Francis Wharton and the Nineteenth Century Insanity Defense: The
Origins of a Reform Tradition, 27 AM J. LEGAL HIST. 223 (1983)(Hinckley acquit-
tal "rejuvenated" insanity defense reform movement).
27. See . MoRAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANnTY DEFENSE OF DANIEL
McNAuGHTAN 191-95 (1981). R. Rogers & C. Ewing, Proscribing Ultimate Opin-
ions: The Quick and Cosmetic Fix, (paper delivered at national conference of the
American Psychological Association convention, August 1988), speculating that,
if the Hinckley jury rejected Hinckley's insanity defense, that decision would
have probably resulted in a public affirmation of our court system and its experts
in the pursuit of justice. See also Rogers & Ewing, Ultimate Opinion Proscrip-
tions: A Cosmetic Fix and a Plea For Empiricism, 13 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 357
(1989). Links between the Hinckley and M Taghten verdicts are explored help-
fully in N. FmIKEL, supra note 7, at ix-xii; . ROGEs, CONDUCTNG INSANrry
EVALUATIONS (1986); English, supra note 22, at 6.
28. Rogers, The American Psychological Association's Position on the Insanity De-
fense: Empiricism Versus Emotionalism, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 840 (1987). See
N. FINKEL, supra note 7, at xii (in the aftermath of the Hinckley verdict, "we
have reinvented the M'Naghten wheel"). Cf. Tanford & Tanford, Better Trials
Through Science: A Defense of Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C.L. REV.
741, 765 (1988)("social acceptance of a verdict does not automatically follow from
verdict accuracy").
Verdicts and post-acquittal release decisions in individual insanity defense
cases where either the verdict or the post-acquittal release were perceived as
"outrageous" have led speedily to the consideration and adoption of the "guilty
but mentally ill" (GBMI) verdict in many jurisdictions. See Fentiman, "Guilty
But Mentally Ill" The Real Verdict is "Guilty," 26 B.C.L. REV. 601, 617-18 (1985);
Hermann & Sor, Convicting or Conifining? Alternative Directions in Insanity
Law Reform: Guilty But Mentally Ill Versus New Rules for Release of Insanity
Acquitees, 1983 B.Y.U. L REv. 449, 543-83; Mickenberg, A Pleasant Surprise: The
Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both Succeeded On Its Own Right and Suc-
cesafully Preserved the Traditional Role of the Insanity Defense," 55 U. CIN. L.
REV. 943, 972-77 (1987); Perlin, supra note 1, at 640 n.178. See generally Keilitz,
supra note 4, at 308; McGraw, Farthing-Capowich & Keilitz, The 'Guilty But Men-
tally Ill' Plea and Verdict Current State of the Knowledge, 38 VnL. L. REv. 117
(1985).
29. See, e.g., Gerard, The Usefulness of the Medical Model to the Legal System, 39
RUTGERS L. REV. 377, 410 (1987)(discussing the case of Garrett Trapnell who al-
legedly feigned insanity successfully on six occasions and society's negative reac-
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to be little discussion in the literature of the uniqueness of this ulti-
mate "throw-the-baby-out-with-the-bath-water" response.3 0 It is ac-
cepted, almost as a given, that an unpopular verdict will lead to
abolition cries. Yet, unpopular verdicts based on other excusing crimi-
nal law defenses do not lead to similar reform suggestions,31 notwith-
standing the common law's deeply rooted hostility toward all such
excuse defenses.32
There have been few recent criminal cases that have polarized ma-
jor metropolitan areas in the same way as did the Bernhard Goetz
trial.33 The specific legal question was a fairly narrow one that has
provoked criminal law scholars for centuries: the standard to be used
in assessing whether a defendant's use of deadly force was justified
under the circumstances.3 4 However, the combination of the New
York City subway location for the shooting and the contrasting socio-
economic status of the white, middle-class defendant and the black,
inner-city victims led to an emotionally-charged, publicity-driven
trial.35 That trial, already "part of the folklore of American law,"3 6
resulted in a verdict that was seen by a significant number of observ-
tion to such cases). On the heuristic significance of the Trapnell case in
animating President Nixon's attempt to abolish the insanity defense, see Perlin,
supra note 1, at 670 n.318 (discussing Gerber, The Insanity Defense Revisited,
1984 ARIz. ST. L.J. 83, 117-18).
30. But see, e.g., Steadman, Empirical Research on the Insanity Dgfense, 477 ANNALS
58, 69 (1985)(intent of New York state insanity defense "reforms" "was to in-
crease the certainty of avoiding another Adam Berwid, who, while on a weekend
hospital leave, murdered his wife while her last words were recorded on NYC's
emergency '911' telephone number").
31. See, eg., Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273, 279 (1968).
This does not suggest that the public does not become regularly enraged about
individual jury acquittals or its perceptions of the overall rate of jury acquittals.
While these may lead to outcries against the perceived incompetence of jurors or
the deficiencies inherent in the jury system, the attacks are rarely, if ever, fo-
cused on a specific substantive defense. See, e.g., V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING
THE JURY 133 (1986)(discussing J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, JURY TRIALS
(1979)).
32. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1269,
1295 (1974).
33. People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 497 N.E.2d 41, 506 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1986). See, e.g., L.
RUBIN, QUIET RAGE: BERNIE GoETz IN A TIME OF MADNESS (1986); Heller, A Pro-
fessor Watches the Law Come to Life, CHRONICLE HIGHER EDUc., June 24,1987, at
3 (discussing George Fletcher's observations of the Goetz trial); Fletcher, Goetz
on Trial, 39 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, April 23, 1987, at 22 (reviewing L. RUBIN, supra).
34. See, e.g., W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAw §§ 3.7(g), 5.7(c)(2d ed. 1986).
35. See generally Comment, Bernard Goetz, A "Reasonable Man" A Look At New
York's Justification Defense, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1149 (1988); Note, The Proper
Standard for Self-Defense in New York. Should People v. Goetz Be Viewed As
Judicial Legislation or Judicial Restraint? 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 845 (1988).
36. Heller, supra note 33, at 3 (quoting Fletcher, supra note 33, at 22). See also Ro-
senfeld, Afterthoughts on the Goetz Case, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 11, 1987, at 2 (editorial).
[Vol. 69:3
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ers as outrageous. 37
Self-defense is a defense that, by all anecdotal and observational
accounts, is used frequently in criminal courts, as it was in the Goetz
case.38 Yet, following Goetz's trial, there were no cries for the aboli-
tion of the self-defense defense.3 9 Similarly, auto manufacturer John
DeLorean was acquitted of narcotics and conspiracy charges based on
his successful use of the entrapment defense. However, no bills have
been introduced into Congress to eliminate entrapment as a criminal
law defense. 40
What is it about the insanity defense which animates the public's
response? Why does the sensational case appear to have such a dispro-
portionate impact on the development of jurisprudence? 41 To some
extent, the insanity defense is different.42 It involves unconscious
motivations and inevitably involves profound issues such as free will,
37. See, eg., Goetz Verdict Will Endanger Young Black Males, Leaders Say, 72 JE',
July 6, 1987, at 18; Rosenfeld, supra note 36, at 2.
38. This, of course, contrasts with the low number of insanity defense pleas. See Rod-
riguez, LeWinn & Perlin, supra note 10, at 401 (in 1982, not guilty by reason of
insanity pleas entered in 50 of 32,500 felony cases handled by New Jersey's Office
of the Public Defender; plea succeeded in fifteen of 50 cases, or 1/20 of 1 per cent
of all felonies).
39. Of course, many observers strongly supported Goetz. See, e.g., Carter, When Vic-
tims Happen To Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 422-24 (1988)(emphasis in original)
(Stories like Goetz's become true "because the popular culture demands their
truth." Goetz becomes a folk-hero, and the central message of the hero-worship-
pers is clear. "We know that what he did was right").
On how the Goetz debate served as an indirect way of talking about race, see
Chase, In the Jungle of Cities, 84 MICH. L. REv. 737, 739-40 n.11 (discussing "socio-
economic and sexual-psychological fear of blacks" as "undercurrent" of law-and-
order politics"). Cf. Mlickenberg, supra note 28, at 962:
If criminal responsibility must attach to all who commit a bad act
regardless of issues of free will, then not just insanity but all other de-
fenses should be abolished. Thus, the individual who injures another in
self-defense should be as guilty of assault as the crazy person who in-
jures another because of his mental illness.
40. The DeLorean case is discussed in Comment, Entrapmen DeLorean and the Un-
dercover Operation: A Constitutional Connection, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 365
(1985). For recent developments on the use of expert psychological testimony as
to a defendant's susceptibility to entrapment, compare United States v. Newman,
849 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1988)(Insanity Defense Reform Act does not preclude ex-
pert testimony on such susceptibility) with United States v. Prickett, 790 F.2d 35
(6th Cir. 1986)(reliance upon insanity precluded raising entrapment defense).
41. But cf. Smith, Scientifc Thought and the Boundaries of Insanity and Criminal
Responsibility, 10 PSYCHOLOGICAL MED. 15 (1980) (emphasis in original)(warning
that insanity defense jurisprudence did not solely develop from "sensational"
cases).
42. Researchers have suggested that criminal justice attitudes may be formed in
ways that separate them from other attitudes because of the public's lack of a
clear idea as to how the criminal justice system actually operates. See Doob &
Roberts, Social Psychology, Social Attitudes, and Attitudes Toward Sentencing,
16 CAN. J. BEHAV. Sci. 269, 270 (1984). The public's specific misperceptions about
1990]
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responsibility, and blame. It incorporates religious ideology, medieval
superstition, and anthropological roots, and the defense draws on rich
myths in a way that insures that "symbolic values" remain necessarily
paramount.43 It is these factors, many of which are not frequently
present in cases involving the use of other criminal defenses, that
leads to a gross distortion of the sensational caseA4 To try to make
sense of this, it is necessary to examine cognitive behavior decision
theory and recent social cognition research in an effort to learn why
we respond to these phenomena the way we do.4
C. The Behavioral Roots of Insanity Defense Decisionmaking: The
Power of Heuristic Reasoning46
Behaviorists are aware of the power of what Dr. David Rosenhan
has characterized as the "distortions of vivid information." As part of
this phenomenon, "concrete and vivid information" about a specific
case "overwhelms" the abstract data upon which rational choices
the operation of the insanity defense within the criminal justice system are even
more distorted. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 646-55.
43. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 1, at 607 n.31 (Jungian views of myths as projections
from the unconscious). See generally Perlin, supra note 6.
44. See Tanford & Tanford, supra note 28, at 763 (footnotes omitted):
Trials do not function solely as searches for truth, games, or any other
single purpose.... [Tihe adversarial process by which results are reached
is just as important as the accuracy of those results. For one thing, trials
serve a symbolic, or legitimating, function. It is essential that both the
present and future disputants perceive that the decision making process
is a fair one; otherwise, disputes may be settled in the streets rather than
in the courts. The adversarial structure reassures litigants that they will
be fully heard before anyone deprives them of liberty or property. Be-
yond that, some scholars argue that the process must not only be per-
ceived as fair, but must in fact be fair. The adversary structure fills this
need by allowing the decision maker to remain neutral and avoid the
natural human tendency to jump quickly to conclusions through heuris-
tic reasoning.
Butsee Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257,267 n.24, 275-76 (1987)(dis-
cussing cultural relativism and provocation defense in the context of State v. Wil-
liams, 4 Wash. App. 908, 484 P.2d 1167 (1971)).
45. See COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (J. Carroll & J. Payne eds. 1976); Saks &
Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial By Heuristics, 15
LAW & Soc'Y REv. 123, 125 (1980-81).
46. For a comprehensive one volume survey of the issues discussed in this section, see
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASEs (P. Slovic & A.
Tversky eds. 1982)[hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAIT]. For helpful
overviews of related areas, see S. BREHM & J. BREHM, PsYCHOLOGICAL
REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL (1981); COGNITION AND
SOCIL BEHAVIOR, supra note 45; R. NISBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE:
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); C. SHERIF, M.
SHERIF & R. NEBERGALL, ATrrrUDE AND ATTITUDE CHANGE: THE SOCIAL
JUDGMENT-INVOLVEMENT APPROACH (1965); Edwards & von Winterfeldt,




are often made.47 Thus, "the more vivid and concrete is better
remembered, over recitals of fact and logic."48 Studies have shown
further that the "vividness effect" is actively present in judicial pro-
ceedings49 and in our perceptions of judicial proceedings.5 0
This distortion results in "trial by heuristics,"51 the use of problem-
47. Rosenhan, Psychological Realities and Judicial Policies, 10 STAN. LAW. 10, 13-14
(1984). Professor Joel Finer has explicitly recognized the impact of the "vivid-
ness effect" on the post-Hinckley debate. Finer, Should the Insanity Defense Be
Abolished? An Introduction to the Debate, 1 J. HEALTH & L. 113 (1986-87). See
also D. BAZELON, QUESTIoNING AUTHORrry: Jus'ncE AND CRu=AL LAw 28
(1988)("Run-of-the-mill muggings by street [gangs] are too common for the front
pages, but even the most banal burglary is newsworthy if committed by someone
with a psychiatric history").
48. Ford, The Role of Extralegal Factors in Jury Verdicts," 1 JUST. SYS. J. 16, 23
(1986). See also Bank & Poythress, THE ELEMENTS OF PERSUASION IN EXPERT
TESTIMONY, 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 173 (1982). On the psychological tendency to
employ the defense mechanism of avoidance following a vivid, stressful incident,
see Horowitz, Wilner & Alvarez, Impact of Event Scale: A Measure of Subjective
Stress, 41 PSYCHOSOmATIc MED. 209 (1979).
For contrasting research inquiries about the "vividness" effect, compare Tay-
lor & Thompson, Stalking the Elusive "Vividness" Effect, 89 PSYCHOLOGICAL
REv. 155 (1982)(finding little support in the experimental literature for the hy-
pothesis that vividly presented information is more persuasive than information
presented in a non-vivid manner) with Shedler & Manis, Can the Availability
Heuristic Explain Vividness Effects? 51 J. PERSONALIry & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 26
(1986)(vividness positively affected recall of material and subsequent judgments,
but availability was not found to be a critical factor in mediating the impact of
vividly presented information).
49. See, eg., Bell & Loftus, Vivid Persuasion in the Courtroom, 49 J. PERSONALITY
ASsEssMENT 659, 663 (1985)(vivid information at trial may "garner more atten-
tion, recruit more attention from memory, cause people to spend more time in
thought, be more available in memory, be perceived as having a more credible
source, and have a greater affective impact"); Doob & Roberts, supra note 42, at
279 (in one study, subjects presented with information about a single welfare re-
cipient generalized data to all recipients even when told the particular exemplar
was highly atypical of the population at large).
50. See, e.g., Alschuler, "Close Enough For Government Work" The Exclusionary
Rule After Leon, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 309, 347-48 (fear that application of exclu-
sionary rule might potentially free "next year's Son of Sam" will overwhelm em-
pirically-based arguments in support of rule); Diamond & Stalans, The Myth of
Judicial Leniency on Sentencing, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 73, 87-88 (1989)(vividness of
media stories about particularly violent criminal offenses has a "disproportionate
impact" on public perceptions about crime); Nisbett, Borgider, Crandall & Reed,
Popular Induction" Information Is Not Necessarily Informative, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 46, at 101, 113 (comparing "influenceability" by
abstract and concrete information)[hereinafter Popular Induction]; Slovic,
Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in
JUDG=NT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 46, at 463, 468 (impact of biased
newspaper coverage on perceived risks in cases of various disaster scenarios).
51. Saks & Kidd, supra note 45. See generally Tanford & Tanford, supra note 28, at
748-49; Tversky, Features of Similarity, 84 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 327 (1977); Tver-
sky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JuD-
MENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 46, at 3; Walker & Monahan, Social
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solving methods to keep "the information-processing demands of a
task within the bounds of [individuals'] limited cognitive capacity."52
Through the use of social cognitive research and behavior decision
theory,53 I will examine how the use of such principles which appear
to guide the simplification of complex information-processing tasks -
"simplifying heuristics" - actually lead to distorted and systemati-
cally erroneous decisions54 and lead decisionmakers to ignore or mis-
Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 576-78
(1987). On the impact of heuristics on individual psychiatric decisionmaking, see
Bagby, The Indigenous Paraprofessional and Involuntary Civil Commitment- A
Return to Community Values, 25 CAN. PSYCHOLOGY 167, 172 (1984)(psychiatric
judgment is often "inextricably woven with social class bias"); Jackson, Psychiat-
ric Decision-Making for the Courts: Judges, Psychiatrists, Lay People?" 9 INT'L J.
L. & PSYCHIATRY 507 (1986)(psychiatric decisionmakers may be as susceptible to
heuristic bias as lay persons). On heuristics in a political perspective, see Quat-
trone & Tversky, Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political
Choice, 82 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 719 (1988). The value and significance of Tversky
and Kahneman's research is trivialized in Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1368-69 (1987).
52. Carroll & Payne, The Psychology of the Parole Decision Process: A Joint Applica-
tion ofAttribution Theory and Information Processing Psychology, in COGNITION
AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 45, at 13, 21.
53. Saks & Kidd, supra note 45, at 125. For a full elaboration, see, e.g., Kahneman &
Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 237 (1973);
Tversky, Features of Similarity, 84 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 327 (1977); Tversky &
Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1973)[hereinafter Availability]; Tversky &
Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY, supra note 46, at 23 [hereinafter Law of Small Numbers]; Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 51. See generally Tanford & Tanford, supra note 28, at
749-52.
Saks and Kidd wrote primarily in response to Tribe, Trial By Mathematics:
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1393 (1971).
Tribe had asserted that the costs of attempting to integrate mathematics into the
fact-finding process outweighed the benefits. He also believed that keeping a trial
elemental and intuitive would best preserve both the symbolism and humanness
of the trial process, and thus, best serve the courts and society. Tribe stated-
That some mistaken verdicts are inevitably returned even by jurors who
regard themselves as "certain" is of course true but is irrelevant; such
unavoidable errors are in no sense intended, and the fact that they must
occur if trials are to be conducted at all need not undermine the effort,
through the symbols of trial procedure, to express society's fundamental
commitment to the protection of the defendant's rights as a person, as an
end in himself.
Id. at 1374 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
Compare State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 551-52 (Minn. 1987) (Kelley,
J., dissenting) (Saks and Kidd have "successfully challenged" Tribe's conclusions);
G. MELTON, J. PETRILA, N. PoYTHRFss & C. SLOBOGIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUA-
TIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND
LAWYERS 11 (1987)(positions of Saks and Kidd are more persuasive)[hereinafter
HANDBOOK]. See also Walker & Monahan, supra note 51, at 576-77 n.52.
54. Saks & Kidd, supra note 45, at 132. See also Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra
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use rationally useful information.5 5
These principles include the following:
Representativeness: We erroneously view a random sample drawn
from a population as highly representative of that population, i.e., sim-
ilar in all essential characteristics56
Insensitivity to sample size: We intuitively reject the statistical re-
ality that larger samples are more likely to approximate the character-
istics of the population from which it is drawn;57
Illusion of validity: We tend to make intuitive predictions by se-
lecting an outcome most similar to a pre-existing stereotype and ex-
press extreme confidence in such predictions, even where we are
given scanty, outdated, or unreliable information about an unknown;58
Availability: We tend to judge the probability or frequency of an
event based on the ease with which we can recall occurrences of the
note 46, at 227 (discussing elements of cognitive illusions); Klahr, The Social Psy-
chologist as Troll, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 45, at 243,245.
55. Carroll & Payne, supra note 52, at 21. On the role of heuristics in legal decision-
making in the area of the right of pretrial detainees to refuse psychotropic medi-
cation, see Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Questions of Competency?
Stripping the Facade from United States v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 957
(1990). On the role of heuristics in the public's conception of the relationship
between deinstitutionalization and homelessness, see Perlin, Competency, Dein-
stitutionalization and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 Hous. L.
REv. (1990)(in press)[hereinafter Competency].
56. Dangerous behavior is overpredicted by psychiatrists and clinical psychologists
because of inappropriate reliance on the representative heuristic where a person
facing involuntary civil commitment is compared to the stereotype of a dangerous
person. Saks & Kidd, supra note 45, at 133 (discussing Kabneman & Tversky,
Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE Psy-
CHOLOGY 430 (1972)); Perlin, supra note 1, at 693-96. See also Law of Small Num-
bers, supra note 53, at 23. Compare Fisher, Pierce & Appelbaum, How Flexible
Are Our Civil Commitment Statutes? 39 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 711
(1988)(more restrictive civil commitment legislation also frequently follows a
random violent act by an insanity acquittee). Because the rare false negative re-
ceives such extensive negative publicity, we overattribute representativeness to
that category. See Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra note 46, at 237, (discussing
Kalneman & Tversky, supra note 53). See generally Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo,
The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRM & DELINQ. 371 (1972).
57. See Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra note 46, at 235 (discussing Law of Small
Numbers, supra note 53); Saks & Kidd, supra note 45, at 134 ("this fundamental
notion of statistics is evidently not part of people's repertoire of intuitions").
Like the "illusion of validity" discussed infra text accompanying note 58, this
heuristic may be viewed as a subcategory of representativeness.
58. Saks & Kidd, supra note 45, at 135. Moreover, we frequently fill in the gaps in
our evidence base with information consistent with our preconceived notions of
what evidence should support our belief, a phenomenon also known as "filling."
See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLENT-
CENTERED APPROACH 45 (1977). See generally Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid, Social
Perception and Interpersonal Behavior: On the Self-Fu~illing Nature of Social
Stereotypes, 35 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 656, 657 (1977).
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event;5 9
Illusory correlation: We erroneously report correlations between
two classes of events that are not really correlated, are correlated to a
lesser extent than is reported, or really are correlated in an opposite
direction;6 0
Adjustment and anchoring: Our adjustments or revisions of initial
estimates frequently depend heavily on initial values;61
Overconfidence in judgments: We tend to overestimate how much
we already know and underestimate how much we have recently
learned;62
59. Saks & Kidd, supra note 45, at 137 (citing Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 51).
See also Availability, supra note 53, at 163; Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Cog-
nitive Processes and Societal Risk Taking, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR,
supra note 45, at 165.
Extensive publicity about some atrocious crime greatly enhances lay assess-
ment of how probable the event is. Edwards & Von Winterfeldt, supra note 46, at
248. However, as the most salient experiences are the ones which are the most
bizarre and extreme, they are precisely the "poorest instances on which to con-
struct decision making policies." Saks & Kidd, supra note 45, at 139.
As a correlative of this phenomenon, Saks and Kidd also report studies con-
firming that experts reporting scientific and/or statistical data are likely to have
less of an impact on factfinders than a person who reports a case study, relates a
compelling personal experience, or offers anecdotal evidence. Such anecdotal evi-
dence is viewed as "more concrete, vivid and emotion-arousing", and thus, more
easily understood. Id. at 137 (citing Nisbett & Temoshok, Is There an 'External"
Cognitive Style?"' 33 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 36 (1976)). See also
Kelley, The Process of Causal Attribution, 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107, 122
(1973)("the preference for simple rather than complex causal explanations not
only is characteristic of children but also ... persists into adulthood"); HANDBOOK
supra note 53, at 10-12 (discussing courts' preference for idiographic or case-cen-
tered testimony). On the impact of the "personality-centered communication,"
see Rosenthal, The Concept of the Paramessage in Persuasive Communication, 58
Q. J. SPEECH 15, 20-23 (1972). It is not coincidental that political commentators
have credited much of the personal popularity of President Reagan - Hinckley's
victim - to his ability to capitalize on this sort of heuristic, "anecdotal evidence."
See M. Perlin, supra note 19.
For more information, see Van Zandt, Commonsense Reasoning, Social
Change and the Law, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 894, 917 n.120 (1987)(anecdotal evidence,
such as oral stories, tales, and myths, plays a major role in people's understanding
of their society; individuals routinely accept as highly probative evidence that
would otherwise constitute hearsay), and infra text accompanying notes 134-43.
For an experimental investigation into the positive relationship between recall
and persuasion, see Insko, Lind & LaTour, Persuasion, Recal4 and Thoughts, 7
REPRESENTATE RES. SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 66 (1976).
60. Saks & Kidd, supra note 45, at 139 (citing, Chapman & Chapman, Genesis of Pop-
ular But Erroneous Psychodiagnostic Observations, 74 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL-
OGY 193 (1967)).
61. The phenomenon that differing initial values lead to differing final estimates is
known as "anchoring." Saks & Kidd, supra note 45, at 140-41.
62. Saks & Kidd, supra note 45, at 143. For example, lawyers are found to be signifi-
cantly overconfident in predicting their chances of winning a hypothetical case.
See Loftus & Wagenaar, Lawyers' Predictions of Success, 28 JuRImE cs J. 437
INSANITY DEFENSE
Under-incorporation of statistical information: Contrary to the
common belief that statistical reliance results in the production of un-
duly persuasive data, we do not process probabilistic information well,
and as a result, unduly ignore statistical information;6 3 and
The myth of Particularistic proofs: We misassume that case-spe-
cific, anecdotal information is qualitatively different from base-rate,
statistical information.64
When recognized and ultimately understood, these heuristic
reasoning devices can shed new light on the hidden issues underlying
insanity defense decisionmaking.65 To take one example, the simplify-
ing heuristic of attribution theory6 6 teaches that, once a person adopts
(1988). See generally Oskamp, Overconfulence in Case-Study Judgments, in
JuDGLMNT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 46, at 287. Further, very difficult
judgments produce the most overconfidence. Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra
note 46, at 239 (citing Pitz, Subjective Probability Distribution for Imperfectly
Known Quantities, in KNOWLEDGE AND COGNITION (L. Gregg ed. 1974)).
63. Saks & Kidd, supra note 45, at 148-49 (responding to Tribe, supra note 53, at 1334,
1376).
64. Saks & Kidd, supra note 45, at 151; Tribe, supra note 53, at 1330 n.2 ("all factual
evidence is ultimately "statistical" "). See also J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, SOCIAL
SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 248-49 (on impacts of probabilistic ver-
sus particularistic evidence); Walker & Monahan, supra note 51, at 576 (aggregate
"statistical" information is likely to be highly undervalued by lay
decisionmakers).
65. One example of the availability heuristic in a collateral area should be illustra-
tive. When asked about whether a sentencing judge was too lenient in an individ-
ual case, 80% of all respondents who had read a newspaper account of the case
agreed while only 14.8% of those who had read a court transcript came to the
same conclusion. Diamond & Stalans, supra note 50, at 88 (citing Doob & Rob-
erts, supra note 42). See also Harris & Harvey, Attribution Theory: From Phe-
nomenal Causality to the Intuitive Social Scientist and Beyond, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ORDINARY SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 57 (C. Antad ed. 1981). Harris and
Harvey stated.
[The use of the availability heuristic can account for frequently seen
types of attributional bias.... [I]f one had to judge the chances of a
discharged mental patient being dangerous, one might only access dra-
matic memories of particular discharged patients (eg., memories of their
violent behaviour) presumably because such memories are more avail-
able. If so, then one would judge a particular patient as having a greatly
inflated chance of being dangerous, ignoring data which suggest, in gen-
eral, that discharged mental patients are most likely to be docile and
non-violent.
Id. at 83.
66. See, eg., Burger, Motivational Biases in the Attribution of Responsibility for an
Accident, A Meta-Analysis of the Defensive-Attribution Hypothesis, 90 PsYCHo-
LOGICAL BULL. 496 (1981); Kelley, supra note 59; Popular Induction, supra note
50. For a consideration of attribution theory in the context of prison inmates'
explanations about the causes of their criminality, see Saulnier & Perlman, In-
mates'Attribution&. Their Antecedents and Effects on Coping, 8 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAv. 159 (1981). Cf. Shatter, Telling and Reporting: Prospective and Retro-
spective Uses of Se!f-Ascriptions, in Harris & Harvey, supra note 65, at 157 (criti-
cizing attribution theory from a humanistic perspective).
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a stereotype, a wide variety of information will be seen by that individ-
ual to reinforce that stereotype. Such information may include events
that could equally support the opposite interpretation;67 that process
is sometimes characterized as dispositional consistency.6 8
In short, a stereotype functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Once
formed, beliefs about oneself, others, or relationships can even survive
and persevere in light of "the total discrediting of the evidence that
first gave rise to such beliefs."69 Thus, the biased assimilation
processes may include a propensity to remember the strengths of con-
firming evidence, but not the weaknesses of disconfirming evidence.
Further, the process may cause a person to "judge confirming evi-
dence as relevant and reliable but disconfirming evidence as irrelevant
and unreliable, and to accept confirming evidence at face value while
scrutinizing disconfirming evidence hypercritically."70
Evidence shows that belief polarization will increase, rather than
decrease or remain unchanged, when mixed or inconclusive findings
67. Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid supra note 58, at 657. See generally Russell, The
Causal Dimension Scale: A Measure of How Individuals Perceive Causes, 42 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1137 (1982); Zadny & Gerard, Attributed Inten-
tions and Informational Selectivity, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 34
(1974). There is also a "well-documented tendency for people to seek information
that confirms rather than disconfirms their beliefs." Doob & Roberts, supra note
42, at 279 (citing Snyder & Swann, Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social Interac-
tion, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1202 (1978)).
68. Fiske, Attention and Weight in Person Perception: The Impact of Negative and
Extreme Behaviors, 38 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 889 (1980). See also
Ross & Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Origins and
Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY, supra note 46, at 129 (attribution theory deals with "naive psychology").
69. Lord, Ross & Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects
of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 2098, 2108 (1979). See also Dohrenwend & Chin-Shong, Social
Status and Attitudes Toward Psychological Disorder: The Problem of Tolerance of
Deviance, 32 AM. Soc. REv. 417, 431-33 (1967); Ross & Anderson, supra note 68, at
144-45; Ross, Lepper & Hubbard, Perserverance in Self-Perception and Social
Perception: Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 880 (1975); Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid supra
note 58, at 663. There is also substantial evidence that simplifying devices may
lead to systematic errors in perception and action. See Van Zandt, supra note 61,
at 918 n.125 (citing various sources). These principles control, whether the topic
is law, psychology, or baseball. Thus, in a recent essay reviewing a book about
Joe DiMaggio's 1941 fifty-six game hitting streak, Stephen Jay Gould relies on
heuristic theories to demonstrate that statistically DiMaggio's one-season streak
is "the greatest factual achievement in the history of baseball." Gould, The
Streak of Streaks, N.Y. Rev. Books, Aug. 18, 1988, at 8. Yet, well-known sports
odds-maker Danny Sheridan continues to quote significantly longer odds (100 to 1
as opposed to 75 to 1) on the longevity and unbeatability of Hank Aaron's career
record of 755 home runs. Pursuing Baseball's Elusive Records, USA Today, Sept.
30, 1988, at 7C.
70. Lord, Ross & Lepper, supra note 69, at 2099.
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are assimilated by proponents of opposite viewpoints. This polariza-
tion hypothesis stems from the assumption that data relevant to a be-
lief are not processed impartially.71 The hypothesis posits that people
who hold strong opinions on complex social issues would be likely to
examine relevant empirical evidence in a biased manner.7 2 As a corol-
lary, those individuals would irrationally exaggerate a person's causal
responsibility for an event while underestimating other causal factors
that are logically involved in the event's occurrence.7 3
Public perceptions of a system "burdened by citizen demands and
assailed by unprecedented attempts to use the courts as a vehicle for
social engineering" 74 have been found to be based upon a handful of
worst case studies or an anecdotal "parade of horribles." 75 We re-
spond to social policies in terms of the images they evoke or in con-
formity with views expressed by leaders we respect.76 The evidence
brought to bear in the formulation of such policies is apt to be "incom-
plete, biased, and of marginal probative value - typically, no more
than a couple of vivid, concrete, but dubiously representative instances
or cases."77 In the same vein, individuals tend to generalize from spe-
71. Id. See also Edwards & von Winterfeldt supra note 46, at 233 ("People integrate
two items of information only if both seem to them equally relevant. Otherwise,
high relevance information renders low information irrelevant. One item of in-
formation is more relevant than another if it somehow pertains to it more
specifically").
72. White, Juror Decision Making in the Capital Penalty TriaL An Analysis of
Crimes and Defense Strategies, 11 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 113, 127 (1987)(citing
Lord, Ross & Lopper, supra note 69). See also Ross & Anderson, supra note 68, at
149-50 (discussing "confirmation bias").
73. Landy & Aronson, The Influence of the Character of the Criminal and His Vic-
tim on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors, 5 J. EXPERnIENTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY
141, 141 (1969). Our reasoning is also distorted by the '"indsight illusion"
through which we "consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in
foresight," a phenomenon characterized as "a probablistic version of 'I told you
so."' Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra note 46, at 243 (quoting, in part, Fish-
hoff, For Those Condemned To Study the Past Reflections on Historical Judg-
ments, NEW DiRETIONs FOR MSYODOLOGY OF SOcIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
ScIENCE: FALLIBLE JUDGMENT IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (R. Shweder & D. Fiske
eds. 1980)). See also Slovic, Fischoff & Lichtenstein, supra note 59, at 172.
74. Cavanagh & Sarat, Thinking About Courts: Toward And Beyond A Jurispru-
dence of Judicial Competence, 14 LAw & Soc'y REv. 371,371 (1980). Commenta-
ries referred to include Barton, Beyond the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567
(1975); Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary, 41 PuB. INTEREST 104 (1975);
Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 767 (1977).
75. Cavanagh & Sarat, supra note 74, at 373, 396. See Edwards & von Winterfeldt,
supra note 46, at 241 (even intelligence analysts "overestimate the probabilities of
occurrence of dire events"); V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 31, at 133.
76. Lord, Ross & Lopper, supra note 69, at 2098. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 618-23
(on impact of symbolism on insanity defense jurisprudence).
77. Lord, Ross & Lopper, supra note 69, at 2098. Congress's "fixating" on the Hinck-
ley case clearly reflects this "vividness" effect. See English, supra note 22, at 37
n.211. On the role of this sort of "horror story" in the legislative reduction of
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cific cases to the population from which such cases were drawn and
tend to remember and recall negative and extreme behaviors more
easily than positive, more moderate behaviors.78 Thus, heuristics and
biases shed significant light on our perceptions of the insanity defense
when we consider the extent to which we are inclined to select infor-
mation from relevant cases that tend to support our pre-existing views
of the insanity defense.
1. The Insanity Defense and Human Inference
Public perceptions of the insanity defense comprise a prime exhibit
in the case against the soundness of human cognition and inference.
Heuristics and biases influence public perceptions, combining to pro-
duce invidious scenarios which doggedly resist rational correction.79
For example, insanity defense defenders attempt to use statistics to
rebut empirical myths about how often the defense is used; scientific
studies to demonstrate that "responsibility" is a valid, externally veri-
fiable term, and that certain insanity-pleading defendants are simply
different from "normal" defendants; and principles of moral philoso-
phy to "prove" that responsibility and causation questions are legiti-
mate ones for moral and legal inquiry.0 In contrast, President
Reagan, who was the victim of an insanity-pleader, was able to stir
public opinion against the defense, in large part, because he used a
case-specific style that relied on concrete, vivid and emotion-arousing
anecdotes. Such a technique is instinctively more accessible to the
fact-finder than relying on "boring" empirical studies, and philosophi-
cal debates81 It is no surprise that counterdemands by empiricists
Idaho's insanity defense, see Geis & Meier, Abolition of the Insanity Plea in
Idaho, 477 ANNALS 72, 74-75 (1985).
78. Diamond & Stalans, supra note 50, at 87; Fiske, supra note 68, at 890-91, 904,
points out that (1) individuals who are statistically rare, rare in context, or "visu-
ally highlighted ... all have been shown to attract [disproportionate] attention,"
(2) impressions are most influenced "by their extreme terms," and (3) individuals
"read" negative cues as more important than positive ones, in part, because they
"stand out by virtue of being rare."
79. Mental health clinicians do not escape blame either. See C. WEBSTER, R. MENZIFS
& M. JACKSON, CuNICAL AssEssMENTs BEFORE TRIAL 121 (1982)("rules of psy-
chiatric decision-making are not substantially divergent from the canons and
heuristics of everyday life"); Jackson, The Clinical Assessment and Prediction of
Violent Behavior. Toward a Scientific Analysis, 16 CRIm. JUST. & BEHAv. 114,
115-18 (1989); Jackson, supra note 51, at 519 ("in clinical practice, a knowledge of
how heuristics and biases work to affect judgment may be every bit as important
as clinical acumen per se").
80. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 640-73. These efforts have had negligible effects on
insanity defense jurisprudential developments. See id. at 713-31.
81. See Saks & Kidd, supra note 45, at 137. In a radio broadcast commentary recap-
ping the Reagan Presidency, Jim Angle characterized Reagan by his "ability to
ignore any fact contrary to his views." All Things Considered (National Public
Radio Broadcast, Jan. 20, 1989).
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that change be based on scientific evidence rather than emotionalism
receive scant attention.8 2
Insanity defense decisionmaking is a uniquely fertile field in which
the distortive vividness effect can operate, and in which the legal sys-
tem's poor mechanisms of coping with systematic errors in intuitive
judgment made by heuristic information processors become especially
troubling.83 The chasm between perception and reality on the ques-
tion of the frequency of use of the insanity defense, its success rate,
and the appropriateness of its success rate reflect these effects.8 4
There appears to be some connection between these heuristic falla-
cies and reliance on OCS.85 In his dissent from the Fifth Circuit's de-
cision abandoning the control component of the Model Penal Code's
substantive test,86 Judge Alvin Rubin astutely focused on one aspect
of the majority's decisionmaking process:
Judges are not, and should not be, immune to popular outrage over this
nation's crime rate. Like everyone else, judges watch television, read newspa-
pers and magazines, listen to gossip and are sometimes themselves victims.
They receive the message trenchantly described in a recent book criticizing
the insanity defense: "Perhaps the bottom line of all these complaints is that
guilty people go free - guilty people who do not have to accept judgment or
responsibility for what they have done and are not held accountable for their
actions.... These are not cases in which the defendant is alleged to have
committed a crime. Everyone knows he did it." Although understandable as
an expression of uninformed popular opinion, such a viewpoint ought not to
serve as the basis for judicial decisionmaking; for it misapprehends the very
meaning of guilt.8 7
82. Rogers, supra note 28, at 840. See also Alschuler, supra note 50, at 347-48.
83. Saks & Kidd, supra note 45, at 145. The members of the National Institute of
Mental Health Forensic Advisory Panel implicitly recognized the importance of
anecdotal notoriety in the shaping of an insanity defense jurisprudence: "From
the perspective of [St. Elizabeth's] Hospital, in controversial cases such as Hinck-
ley, the U.S. Attorney's office can be counted upon to oppose any conditional
release recommendation." Final Rsport of the National Institute of Mental
Health (NIMH) Ad Hoc Forensic Advisory Panel, 12 MENTAL & PHYsICAL DISA-
BILTY L. REP. 77,96 (1988)(emphasis added)[hereinafterAd HocReport]. See also
M. Perlin, supra note 19.
84. See also N. Finkel, De Facto Departures From Insanity Instructions: Toward the
Remaking of Criminal Law 20 (1988)(unpublished manuscript)(mock jurors
"keep shifting their relevant and determinative constructs from case to case").
85. This is made explicit in Kelley, supra note 59, at 108 ("it is precisely common
sense with which attribution theory is concerned"). See generally Sherwin, Dia-
lects and Dominance" A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136
U. PA. L. REV. 729 (1988).
86. United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984). Lyons preceded the adoption
of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (IDRA). See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1989).
87. United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994, 999-1000 (5th Cir. 1984)(Rubin, J., dissent-
ing)(emphasis in original; footnote and citation omitted). See English, supra note
22, at 4 (the post-Hinckley abolitionist movement was the result of "reflexive,
rather than reasoned, legislative action"). See also Sherwin, A Matter of Voice
and Plot. Belief and Suspicion in Legal Story Telling, 87 MicH. L. REV. 543, 595
(1988)("Can common sense make sense of interpretive principles, deriving, say,
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The Justice Department's position on post-Hinckiey insanity defense
reform illuminated the issue:
[HIow do we get a hook into this person so that he or she isn't going to go out
and do this again to me, to any of my friends.... If you are so disturbed
mentally that it manifests itself in ... assassinations .... society has a right to
put a hook in you.., until I think it's demonstrated beyond a shadow of a
doubt that you are no longer that type of danger to the community....
The people really don't care if he couldn't help himself. They want to
know what do you do to protect me.8 8
This type of decisionmaking mimics what is characterized as "im-
plicit personality theory," an untested, unconfirmed collection of
ideas that people rely on to explain or predict others.8 9 Thus, if OCS
is a "prereflective attitude" exemplified by the attitude of "What I
know is 'self-evident'; it is 'what everybody knows,' "90 the use of the
heuristic bias becomes even more pernicious in insanity defense
decisionmaking.
D. "Ordinary Common Sense" (OCS): The Unconsciousness of Legal
Decisionmaking
1. Introduction
Ordinary common sense (OCS) can be a powerful unconscious ani-
from a constitutional text, which trump our 'natural' inclination to blame the
factually guilty?"). On the important difference betweenfactual guilt and moral
guilt, see Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure" The War-
ren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L.J. 185, 197-98 (1983);
Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court An Examination of Continuity
and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 436 (1980).
88. Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia
Circuit, 111 F.R.D. 91, 227 (1985)(remarks of Assistant U.S. Attorney General
Stephen Trott). See generally Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall & Reed, Popular Induc-
tion: Information Is Not Necessarily Informative, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BE-
HAVIOR, supra note 45, at 113, 128 (in assessing impact of "sheer number of
instances" as against "iritances of some emotional interest," researchers have
found that "emotional instance has in every case carried the day").
Heuristic decisionmaking in involuntary civil commitment law is described in
Bagby & Atkinson, The Effects of Legislative Reform on Civil Commitment Ad-
mission Rates: A Critical Analysis, 6 BEHAV. Sc:. & L. 45, 46 (1988)("publicly
salient events such as a heinous murder of an innocent victim at the hands of a
discharged mentally ill patient, or community intolerance of deviance, may have
the effect of increasing the rate of commitments"), and Fisher, Pierce & Appel-
baum, supra note 56, at 712.
89. Saks & Kidd, supra note 45, at 135 n.15 (citing Bruner & Tagiuri, The Perception
of People, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (G. Lindzey ed. 1954)).
90. Sherwin, supra note 85, at 737. See also Sherwin, supra note 87, at 595 (common
sense probably would not surrender concrete evidentiary truth to abstract consti-
tutional principles). For a paradigmatic judicial characterization in a collateral
area, see State v. Vaughan, 268 S.C. 119, 126, 232 S.E.2d 328, 331 (1977)("effect of
drunkenness on the mind and on men's actions.., is a fact known to everyone").
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mator of legal decision making.9 ' Often judges' decisions reflect a to-
tal lack of awareness of the underlying psychological issues involved
in a particular case. Rather, judges often focus on such superficial is-
sues as whether a putatively mentally-disabled defendant has a "nor-
mal appearance." 92
Typically,9 3 trial judges will say, the defendant "doesn't look sick
to me," or, even more revealingly, "the defendant is as healthy as you
91. See, ag., Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273,1332 (E.D. Ark. 1983), off'd 758 F.2d
226 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), rely-
ing on, interalia, Berry, Death-qualification and the "Fireside Induction, " 5 U.
ARK. LrrTLE RocK L.J. 1 (1982), to define "fireside induction" as "those common
sense, empirical generalizations about human behavior which derive from intro-
spection, anecdotal evidence, and culturally transmitted beliefs."
92. Perlin, supra note 6, at 83-84 n.811. See generally Perlin, supra note 1, at 713-31.
Rehnquist's opinions reflect the '"meta-myths" of "fear of feigning." See Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 431 (1986)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For stereotypical
visions of mental disability informed primarily by surface views of defendants'
external appearance, see Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 297
(1986)(Rehnquist, J., concurring); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87, 91
(1985)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The opinions also reflect the view that mental
illness is an improperly exculpatory excuse. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
157, 163-71 (1986). On the meaning of "meta-myths," see supra text following
note 10.
In a recent revealing speech, the Chief Justice discussed the impact of public
opinion on judicial decisionmaklng.
Somewhere "out there" - beyond the walls of the courthouse - run
currents and tides of public opinion which lap at the courthouse door....
[Wf these tides of public opinion are sufficiently great and sufficiently
sustained, they will very likely have an effect upon the decision of some
of the cases decided within the courthouse. This is not a case of judges
"knuckling under" to public opinion, and cravenly abandoning their
oaths of office. Judges, so long as they are relatively normal human be-
ings, can no more escape being influenced by public opinion in the long
run than can people working at other jobs.
Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. Rv. 751,
768 (1986)(emphasis added). The degree to which Rehnquist's views mirror pub-
lic consensus on "craziness," the appearance of normality, and criminal nonre-
sponsibility as an exculpating condition is probably not coincidental.
93. On the role of ego defenses in behavior, see Bibring, Dwyer, Huntington & Valen-
stein, Glossary of Defenses, in J. KATz, J. GoLDsTEiN & A. DERSHOWrrZ, PSYCHO-
ANALYSIs, PsYcImATRY AND LAw 155 (1967). Justice Rehnquist is not immune to
this way of thinking. For an analysis of the "fallacies of logic" that pervade Jus-
tice Rehnquist's decisionmaking, see McClurg, Logical Fallacies and the Supreme
Court- A Critical Examination of Justice Rehnquist's Decisions in Criminal Pro-
cedure Cases," 59 U. COLO. L. REv. 741, 837 n.460 (1988). "Courts regularly and
routinely make assumptions about how and why people behave in certain
ways .... ." Haney, Psychology and Legal Change: On the Limits of a Factual
Jurisp e , 4 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 147, 154 (1980). For a rare example of a
judicial opinion "unpacking" the mythology that serves as the building blocks of
"ordinary common sense," see United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994, 999-1000 (5th
Cir. 1984)(Rubin, J., dissenting), discussed supra notes 86-87. On the Courts'fail-
ure to "unpack" such myths in a collateral area (involvement of the judiciary in
refusal of treatment decisionmaking), see Perlin, supra note 55, at 979-93.
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or me."94 In short, where defendants do not conform to "popular
images of 'craziness,' ,95 the notion of a handicapping mental disability
is flatly and unthinkingly rejected.96 Similarly, the "slippery slope"
conflation of mental illness and dangerousness is blindly accepted.97
These views98 reflect the power of OCS.99
94. Perlin, Psychiatric Testimony in a Criminal Setting, 3 BULL. Am. ACAD. PSYCHI-
ATRY & L. 143, 147 (1975).
95. Lasswell, Foreward, to R. ARENs, THE INsANITY DEFENSE at xi (1974). For an
empirical evaluation of how defendants who conform to popular notions of "cra-
ziness" are differentially treated by prosecutors and by courts, see Hochstedler,
Twice-Cursed? The Mentally Disordered Criminal Defendant," 14 CaM. JUST. &
BEHAv. 251, 260 (1987)(mentally disabled defendants were prosecuted in signifi-
cantly different ways from the general population; courts commonly subjected
mentally disabled defendants to court-ordered treatment and were reluctant to
release previously hospitalized defendants on their own recognizance; prosecu-
tors showed "selective leniency," issuing charges less frequently to the formerly-
hospitalized, but more frequently to defendants with histories of chronic health
problems) (emphasis added).
96. R. AnENs, supra note 95, at 77-79, graphically reproduces transcripts of two com-
petency hearings conducted by the same judge on the same day in which the
judge merely asks the defendant the date, the names of the President and the
Vice-President, and the Washington Senators' standing in the American League.
The motion of the defendant who answered the questions correctly was denied,
while the defendant who knew only the President's name was ordered held for
psychiatric evaluation. Id. at 78-79. See generally Perlin, supra note 6, at 83-84
n.811.
97. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.14 (1983). Compare Schmidt,
Supreme Court Decision Making on Insanity Acquitees Does Not Depend on Re-
search Conducted By The Behavioral Science Community: Jones v. United States,
12 J. PsYcHiATRY & L. 507, 512 (1984)(empirical evidence does not support the
common sense of the majority in Jones as much as it supports the responding
speculation of the dissent).
98. See, e.g., Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 805-09 (1970)(discussing Supreme Court's implicit
use of OCS in deciding the leading confession-coercion case of Brown v. Missis-
sippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)). Such judgments are not limited to cases involving
mentally disabled defendants. Complaining that not enough systematic attention
has been focused upon the influence of political, racial, moral, and idiosyncratic
factors in judicial decisionmaking, Professor Randall Kennedy has noted Chief
Justice Burger's sympathy and "admiration" for the "'law-abiding' and 'self-suf-
ficient'" Amish people, as reflected in his opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 212-13 (1972). Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishmen and
the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1417 n.141 (1988). On the role of
"ordinary common sense" in the jurisprudence of law and economics, see Gjerd-
ingen, The Coase Theorem and the Psychology of Common-Law Thought, 56 S.
CAL L. REV. 711, 741-48 (1983).
99. Sherwin, supra note 85, at 737. One important example of such thinking is re-
flected in courts' persistent adherence to patterns of jury instructions in spite of
overwhelming social science evidence as to the jurors' confusion. See infjra text
accompanying notes 238-42. Professors Steele and Thornburg state that, since
judges and lawyers understand the instructions, they believe that jurors probably
understand them as well. Steele & Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent
Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C.L. REv. 77, 99 (1988). In criminal procedure,
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Empirical investigations similarly corroborate the inappropriate
application of OCS to insanity defense decisionmaking.0 Studies
demonstrate that judges "unconsciously express public feelings... re-
flect[ing] the community's attitudes and biases because they are 'close'
to the community."' 0 ' Others show that virtually no members of the
public can actually articulate what the substantive insanity defense
test is.102 Still others illustrate that the public is seriously mis-
informed about both the "extensiveness and consequences" of an in-
sanity defense plea 03 and that the public explicitly and consistently
rejects any such defense substantively broader than the "wild beast"
test.104 These realities may lead into yet one more trap. While judges
and attorneys are accustomed to weighing and interpreting several
factors at once, the conflict that arises from the attorney's fear that a
jury will reject, or will be less impressed by, explanations that require
complex analysis and a lengthy explanation may lead to important
distortions of forensic testimony. 0 5
OCS presupposes two self-evident truths: 1) everyone knows how to assess an
individual's behavior, and 2) everyone knows when to blame someone for doing
wrong. Sherwin, supra note 85, at 738. See also Doob & Roberts, supra note 42, at
275 (the public appears simply to accept the information they have as adequate in
assessing perceived leniency of criminal sentences). CY. Kelman, Interpretive
Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591, 671-72
(1981)("dominant legal thought is nothing but some more or less plausible com-
mon-wisdom banalities, superficialities, and generalities").
100. See, ag., Finkel, Shaw, Bercaw & Koch, Insanity Defenses: From the Jurors'Per-
spective, 9 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 77, 92 (1985)(characterizing the layman's
perspective toward the insanity defense as reflecting "intuitive, common sense").
Cf. State v. Van Horn, 528 So. 2d 529, 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)(rebuttal lay
witness provided jury with "probative perceptions of normalcy").
101. Arens & Susman, Judges, Jury Charges, and Insanity, 13 How. L.J. 1, 34 n.43
(1966). The caselaw reflects each of these traps. See, e.g., Regina v. Turner, 1 Q.B.
834, 841 (1975)("Jurors do not need psychiatrists to tell them how ordinary folk
who are not suffering from any mental illness are likely to react to the stresses
and strains of life"). Professor Finkel's research suggests that expert witnesses
reinforce this sense of conventional morality. N. FINKEL, supra note 7, at 349.
102. Of 434 Delaware residents surveyed, only one gave a "reasonably good approxi-
mation" of the insanity test then operative in that jurisdiction. Hans & Slater,
"Plain Crazy"- Lay Definitions of Legal Insanity, 7 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY,
105-06 (1984).
103. Hans, An Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense, 24 CRIMI.
NOLOGY 393, 411 (1986).
104. Roberts, Golding & Fincham, supra note 8, at 226. Cf. Washington v. United
States, 390 F.2d 444,445 (D.C. Cir. 1967)(In the 1700's, jurors and witnesses 'knew
a wild beast when they saw one").
105. Anderten, Staulcup & Grisso, On Being Ethical in Legal Places, 11 PROF. PSY-
CHOLOGY 764 (1980). '"Thus, the psychologist might be led into this more simplis-
tic manner of reasoning that scientifically and ethically misrepresents the
complexity of most psychological conclusions and potentially distorts the re-
sults." Id. at 769.
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Whatever its general value is in legal decisionmaking,106 OCS is an
incomplete and imperfect tool by which to assess criminality. Anthro-
pologists have shown that the content and style of expression of com-
mon sense varies markedly from one place to another.107 The truth
claims to which OCS gives rise are complex and conflicting, and stem
from diverse situational factors, such as geography, culture, class, edu-
cation, familial background, religion, and current events.1 08 Further-
more, OCS cannot answer such important questions as how a reasoned
argument could hope to dissuade a jury or judge that is committed to a
contrary view of human nature.1 0 9
The dominance of OCS is reflected in the Supreme Court's opinion
in Coy v. Iowa.'1 0 In Coy, the Court held that placing a screen be-
tween a child sexual assault victim and a defendant violated the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to confront his accuser. In Coy,
Justice Scalial" first precedentially"2 invoked the literary and cul-
tural underpinnings of OCS by citing to the Bible and to Shake-
speare, 1 3 and then explained his use of references to and quotations
from antiquity as part of his effort to convey "that there is something
deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation... as
106. See, e.g., Fraher, Adjudicative Facts, Non-Evidentiary Facts, and Permissible
Jury Background Information, 62 IND. L.J. 333, 342-43 (1987)("The constant re-
frain in treatises, case law, and statutes alike, refers to unanimity of belief, com-
mon knowledge, knowledge shared by the community, a common fund of
knowledge, data notoriously accepted by all, information generally known, facts
beyond reasonable dispute, or information whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned"). See also Tanford & Tanford, supra note 28, at 777-78 (psychological
research debunking OCS myths about use of jury challenges).
107. Sherwin, supra note 85, at 738 n.7. See generally C. Ltv-STRAUss, STRucTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY (1965). For a historical reading suggesting that insanity defense
decisionmaking flowed from "the prevailing Protestant religious morality," see
Dain & Carlson, Moral Insanity in the United States, 1835-1866, 117 Am. J. PSY-
CHIATRY 785, 787 (1960). Cf. N. WALKER, CRIME AND INsANITY IN ENGLAND 82
(1973) (prosecutor's characterization of defense forensic expert witness as a "Jew
physician" in 1801 trial).
108. Id. at 829. On the way different ethnic and socioeconomic groups perceive and
define deviance, see Dohrenwend & Chin-Song, supra note 69. See also Gusfield,
On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic Process of Designating Deviance, 56 CALIF.
L. REV. 54, 55-56 (1968)("To assume a common culture or a normative consensus
in American society, as in most modern societies, is to ignore the deep and divi-
sive role of class, ethnic, religious, status, and regional culture conflicts which
often produce widely opposing definitions of goodness, truth, and moral virtue").
109. Sherwin, supra note 85, at 755.
110. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
111. Scalia's opinion was for an "odd bedfellows" majority of himself, Justices Bren-
nan, White, Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor.
112. Directly after citing to these sources and others, Scalia added: "We have never
doubted, therefore, that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a
face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact." Coy v.
Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2800 (1988)(emphasis added).
113. Id. (citing Acts 25:16, and W. Shakespeare, Richard II, act 1, sc. 1).
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essential to a fair trial."114
To ultimately buttress his conclusion that this condition persists,
Scalia quoted at length from remarks made by former President Ei-
senhower on the role played by face-to-face confrontation in the code
of social justice in his home town of Abilene, Kansas:
[1It was necessary to "[m]eet anyone face to face with whom you disagree. You
could not sneak up on him from behind, or do any damage to him, without
suffering the penalty of an outraged citizenry... In this country, if someone
dislikes you, or accuses you, he must come up in front. He cannot hide behind
the shadow."1 1 5
As a result of "these human feelings of what is necessary for fair-
ness,"1'16 the right to confrontation "contributes to the establishment
of a system in which the perception as well as the reality of fairness
prevails."fl7
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, specifically criticized the majority's opinion because of the
reliance on "literature, anecdote, and dicta."I1s Demurring to the as-
sertion that "there is something deep in human nature" that considers
confrontation critical,119 Blackmun relied instead on Wigmore's trea-
tise that expressed a contrary view on how essential confrontation is
to a fair trial. Blackmun concluded: "I find Dean Wigmore's state-
ment infinitely more persuasive than President Eisenhower's recollec-
tion of Kansas justice . . . or the words Shakespeare placed in the
mouth of his Richard II concerning the best means of ascertaining the
truth."120
The right to confront accusers in a juvenile sexual assault case is an
issue that would be expected to raise powerful unconscious feelings in
jurors and judges.121 Where powerful OCS exists, it unfortunately can
become a mechanism to establish constitutional policy. As in Coy, Jus-
114. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2801 (1988)(quoting, in part, Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 404 (1965)).
115. Id. at 2801 (1988)(quoting Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation" Its History and
Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381 (1959)). Scalia followed with this observation:
"The phrase exists, 'Look me in the eye and say that."' Id.
116. Id. at 2801.
117. Id. at 2802 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986)).
118. Id. at 2805-06 (1988)(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Chief Justice apparently
failed to see the irony in this critique of Scalia's opinion. Cf. Wainwright v.
Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284,297 (1986)(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (relying on an OCS-
ical "reading" of external manifestations of mental illness in determining
whether a request for counsel following administration of Miranda warnings was
probative of sanity, and noting that the defendant was not "incoherent or obvi-
ously confused or unbalanced").
119. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2807 (1988).
120. Id. at 2807.
121. The defendant had been charged with sexually assaulting two 13 year old girls




tice Scalia's view of human nature based on the archetypal historical
stories of the Bible and Shakespeare, and on President Eisenhower's
fin de siecle notions of justice become the foundation of future consti-
tutional law.122 Scalia neither considers the meretricious power of
OCS in the formulation of this policy, nor acknowledges the "diverse
situational factors" that inform our individualized concepts of OCS.n3
Contemporaneous psychologists and researchers are no strangers
to this issue. In a study of the beliefs of one hundred psychologists
about depression and antidepressive behavior, consensus as to the
truth of certain assertions ranged from total to near-complete disa-
greement. This prompted the study's director to conclude that far
greater study was needed in exploring "the paradoxically unknown
territory of 'what everybody knows' about depression." 124 Similarly,
the terrain of what "everybody knows" about insanity is perilously un-
chartered.125 However, courts and legislatures regularly base deci-
sions upon perceptions about OCS and mental illness. OCS should not
be applied to insanity defense law jurisprudence, where human behav-
ior is very often opposite to what OCS would suggest.1 2 6 The reliance
on such propositions by legal decisionmakers is risky at best and prob-
ably reflects a refusal to acknowledge the bases and applicability of
psychodynamic principles to the questions at hand.327
122. This view is only tepidly replied to in Justice Blackmun's dissent. On the other
hand, Blackmun noted that Wigmore had discussed the passage from Shake-
speare's Richard II used by Scalia in his majority opinion, and that, according to
Wigmore, the view of confrontation there expressed reflected an "earlier concep-
tion" that had merged with the principle of cross-examination by the time the
Bill of Rights was ratified. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2807 n.3 (1988)(Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
123. Sherwin, supra note 85, at 755. See also supra text accompanying notes 107-09.
The question remains open as to whether judges truly comprehend the reasons
that animate their decisionmaking. See Konecini & Ebbesen, External Validity
of Research in Legal Psychology, 3 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 39 (1979), discussed in J.
MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note 64, at 158 (great discrepancy found between
reasons judges gave for sentencing decisions and factors that actually seemed to
determine sentences).
124. Rippere, Commonsense Beliefs About Depression and Antidepressive Behaviour
A Study of Social Consensus, 15 BEHAv. REs. & THERAPY 465,467 (1977). See also
Rippere, What's the Thing To Do When You're Feeling Depressed? - A Pilot
Study, 15 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 185 (1977).
125. See Rogers, Turner, Helfield & Dickens, Forensic Psychiatrists and Psycholo-
gists' Understanding of Insanity: Misguided Expertise? 33 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY
671 (1988)(88 percent of experienced forensic psychiatrists had erroneous beliefs
about the proper legal standard).
126. See Bromberg & Cleckley, The Medico-Legal Dilemma: A Suggested Solution, 42
J. CRiM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL Sc. 729, 738 (1952)(to the lay person, the tem-
porarily delirious patient "leaping over chairs and taking the broom-stick to hal-
lucinatory monsters" still looks more genuinely psychotic than does "a deeply
disturbed" but calm schizophrenic). See generally Sherwin, supra note 85.
127. See, e.g., GROUP FOR THE ADvANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, CRIMINAL REsPONSIBIL-
rrY AND PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMoNY, REP. No. 26 (1954) [hereinafter GAP REPORT
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2. OCS and the Insanity Defense
I propose that this reliance on OCS is one of the keys to an under-
standing of why and how our insanity defense jurisprudence has de-
veloped. Not only is it "prereflexive" and "self-evident," 28 it is
susceptible to precisely the type of idiosyncratic, reactive decisionmak-
ing that has traditionally typified insanity defense legislation and liti-
gation. 29 It also ignores our rich, cultural, heterogenic fabric 30 that
makes futile any attempt to establish a unitary level of OCS to govern
decisionmaking in an area where we have traditionally been willing to
base substantive criminal law doctrine on medieval conceptions of sin,
redemption, and religiosity. Paradoxically, the insanity defense is nec-
essary precisely because it rebuts everyday inferences about the mean-
ing of conduct.' 3 ' In the words of the Group for Advancement of
Psychiatry: "The problem involves more than common sense." 3 2
Extensive reliance on OCS infects all players in the drama. Care-
ful research studies have thus found that judges, attorneys, legislators,
and mental health professionals all inappropriately employ irrelevant,
stereotypical negative information in coming to conclusions on the re-
lated question of a mentally disabled criminal defendant's dangerous-
ness.133 In short, unwitting reliance on OCS is a hidden animator of
criminal justice decisionmaking, whether the decisionmaker is a
judge, a juror, a legislator, or an expert witness. Because insanity de-
fense judgments are shrouded in myth, weighed down by symbol, and
arise frequently from unconscious and unarticulated motivations, it is
especially important that we acknowledge OCS's power if we are to
truly understand the operation of the defense.
3. Jurisprudential Approaches to Explaining Deviance
The process of "coming to grips with the world" known as "typifi-
(even the M'Naghten rules accept the fact that not all individuals are accounta-
ble; the problem involves more than common sense).
128. Sherwin, supra note 85, at 737. Cf. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Inter-
pretative Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74
GEo. L.J. 1371, 1406 n.142 (1986)(citing sources rejecting suggestions that respon-
sibility be assessed in light of "intrapsychic forces" and "neurochemical
reactions").
129. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.14 (1983); Perlin, supra note 1, at
636-40.
130. See Gusfield, supra note 108, at 55-56.
131. Sendor, supra note 128, at 1372.
132. GAP REPORT, supra note 127, at 1. See D. BAZELON, supra note 47, at 6 (for every
complex problem in our society, there is a solution that is simple but wrong.)
133. Jackson, supra note 79, at 125-26. See also Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 56,
reprinted in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 46, at 34-35 (sophisti-
cated psychologists equally susceptible to representativeness heuristic); Tversky
& Katneman, supra note 51, at 18 (those with extensive training in statistics sim-
ilarly inappropriately rely on heuristics in making probability assessments).
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cation"1 34 helps illuminate the way we think about deviance. Typifica-
tion involves characterizing a current experience as one which is
familiar to the individual. 3 5 For example, we learn to understand de-
viance by viewing and classifying the types of deviance that we see
every day.'3 6 When pressed to explain the fact of deviation, the lay-
man may redirect the question by talking about the type of person the
deviant is thought to be: brutal, immature, irresponsible, vicious, in-
considerate, or degenerate. 137 To some extent, this is all a self-fulfil-
ling prophecy; as long as we have faith in our stereotypes, we continue
to treat others in ways that elicit from them behaviors that support
those stereotypes.138
We also seek to vindicate our OCS ideas so that they will be accu-
rate for all foreseeable practical purposes.139 This type of thought
processing leads to the "attribution" heuristic:140 where new exper-
iences do not fit neatly into our pre-existing data-base, we will engage
in complex elaborations prior to relinquishing our theories. Conse-
quently, simple rational argumentation will be unavailing to change
134. Van Zandt, supra note 59, at 913 (citing Cicourel, Interpretive Procedures and
Normative Rules in the Negotiation of Status and Role, in CoGNrIvE SOCIOLOGY
11, 35 (1972)).
135. Van Zandt, supra note 59, at 914. Van Zandt's illustration exemplified typifica-
tion of the mentally disabled:
[If I am approached on a public street by an individual who appears di-
sheveled and who is babbling incomprehensible sentences, I am likely to
categorize that experience as one involving a mentally disturbed person
whose condition is explainable by the presence of mental "disease." I
may not know precisely what "disease" he has or what his long-term
prognosis might be. It is sufficient for my practical purposes that I am
able to understand this experience in that way, predict from that under-
standing this person's short-term behavior, and adjust my behavior ac-
cordingly. Although this process of typification is more noticeable in
unusual situations, it is essential to everyday life. Routine and habit are
the stuff that makes the world turn; without them, we would be forced
to start from scratch on each occasion.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
For works stressing the way that police authorities rely on commonsense un-
derstanding to categorize juvenile delinquency and skid row behavior and to de-
termine the appropriate response, see id. at 914 n.106.
136. Id. at 915 n.109 (citing A. SCHULTZ, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD
77, 80-82 (G. Walsh & F. Lehnert, trans. 1972)). See also id. at 915 n.112 (citing
Cohen, Introduction, to IMAGES OF DEVIANCE at 9, 10 (S. Cohen ed. 1971)).
137. Id. at 915 n.112 (citing Cohen, supra note 136). This process of typification simi-
larly affects juror decisionmaking, the construction of the jurors' "story" depends
significantly on jurors' OCS understanding of the way people behave in a given
situation. Id. at 916 n.115 (citing Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in
Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 242, 247
(1986)).
138. Id. at 926 n.158 (quoting Snyder, When Belief Creates Reality, 18 ADVANCES EX-
PERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 247, 296 (1984)).
139. Id. at 917-18.




These OCS formulations differ radically from theories constructed
by philosophers and scientists. Philosophical and scientific theories
generally seek a broader perspective and search for a high degree of
systematic consistency. Scientists and philosophers will generally
base their views on a more complete information set than that em-
ployed by individuals facing practical problems. In contrast, the lay-
man's orientation toward particular issues will often "trump"
concerns for consistency.142
Legal rules thus operate against a background of commonsense un-
derstanding about the world that constitutes the formative context as
a stock of knowledge. There are four main strands of the relationship
between law and OCS: (1) legal rules may be formulations derived
from the decisionmaker's common sense theories of the world; (2) a
lawmaker may choose a rule based on his or her estimation of the con-
sistency of that rule with his or her world view; (3) most legal rules
remain uncontested because society either agrees with the governing
principles or is indifferent to them, but where rules do deviate from
OCS, they fail to be supported; and (4) in spite of the general consen-
sus between OCS and legal rule-making, the coercive force of law is
still important for two reasons: (a) to deter faulty judgments about
the proper course of action, and (b) to provide resources for the negoti-
ation of practical problems.143
4. Conventional Morality
In considering the relationship between the standards of judicial
lawmaking and "dominant, conventional morality," 44 there are two
distinct dimensions to OCS: 1) the OCS employed by courts in decid-
ing the legal status of a particular practice, e.g., the decriminalization
of homosexuality or abortion, and 2) the OCS used in cases where
there is less doubt as to legal status, but where public morality must
"give moral content to the standards by which the practice is legally
141. Van Zandt, supra note 59, at 918, 921-22. See generally D. HEISE, UNDERSTANDING
EvENTS 8 (1979); Snyder, supra note 138, at 248.
142. Van Zandt, supra note 59, at 919-20. For a striking example of the way OCS
"trumps" social science, see Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of
Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REv. 111, 121 (1988)(discussing McCleskey v.
Kemp, 418 U.S. 279 (1987)).
143. Van Zandt, supra note 59, at 933-36. A legislator's evaluation of the potential
effectiveness of a new sanction will thus be based in large part on his or her own
understanding of what motivates individual behavior. Id. at 934.
144. Sadurski, Conventional Morality and Judicial Standards, 73 VA. L. Rrv. 339, 341
(1987). The idea of a "community tolerance threshold" in insanity defense cases
is explored in Perlin, supra note 1, at 704-06. See also Boehnert, Psychological
and Demographic Factors Associated With Individuals Using the Insanity De-
fense, 13 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 227-28 (1985).
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assessed," i.e., a community must decide whether a particular publica-
tion is obscene.145
It is the first grouping - where there are "yes-or-no" divisions of
public opinion and where no "general average of community thinking
and feeling" can be discerned in "hotly disputed situations" - which
poses the more difficult questions when examined through an OCS
filter. Search for consensus is made all the more difficult where many
members of the community express no view on the underlying subject
matter, others hold views that are "clearly mutually inconsistent,"
and yet others express one set of attitudes in considering concrete pol-
icies and another incongruent set while responding more abstractly.146
Faced with this muddy landscape, judges' ascertainments of a con-
ventional morality occupy a broad range of positions between two ex-
tremes: the representation of their own moral standards as
community morality, and radical skepticism as to the possibility of
stating what the conventional morality is.147 Located on a continuum
between these end points are the seemingly-intermediate positions ar-
ticulated in Furman v. Georgia 148 by Justice Marshall who rejected
results of public opinion polls based on responses of people not "fully
informed" as to the death penalty's purposes,149 and by Justice Bren-
145. Sadurski, supra note 144, at 351-54. For a broader exposition of Sadurski's juris-
prudential views, see Sadurski, The Right the Good, and the Jurisprude, 7 LAW &
PHIL. 35 (1988).
146. Sadurski, supra note 144, at 355-58. See L. FREE & H. CANTRmI, The Political
Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion 36-37 (1968); B. HENNESY, PUB-
IC OPINION 345 (1965).
147. Sadurski, supra note 144, at 360. The paradigm expression of the first position is
the famous "I-know-it-when-I-see-it" definition of obscenity in Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)(Stewart, J., concurring). The second position might be
characterized as "I can't fathom how others see it." See id. at 361 (quoting and
discussing In re Lolita, 1961 N.Z.L.R. 542, 549 (C.A.)(Gresson, P., dissenting)).
148. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See generally M. Perlin, supra note 19. Sadurski, supra note
144, at 362-66, rejects both Marshall's and Brennan's positions as well.
149. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361 (1972)(Marshall, J., concurring). This may
be characterized as the "they'd know it if they really saw it" argument. See
Sadurski, supra note 144, at 363-64 (characterizing as "pretextual" Marshall's
subsequent dissent in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 232 (1976), that, if Ameri-
cans "were better informed, they would consider [the death penalty] shocking,
unjust, and unacceptable"). But see Doob & Roberts, supra note 42, at 277 (Be-
cause the public's attitudes toward judicial sentencing are shaped not by reality
that takes place in courts but by mass media, policy makers should not interpret
the public's apparent desire for harsher penalties at face value; rather, they
should understand this "widespread perception of leniency is founded upon in-
complete and frequently inaccurate news accounts."); Vidmar & Dittenhoffer, In-
formed Public Opinion and Death Penalty Attitudes, 23 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 43,
52 (1981)("on the whole, if the public were informed, opinion polls would show
more people opposed to capital punishment than favor it"). On the heuristic bi-




nan who relied on "actual social practice and public opinion" to sup-
port his argument. 5 0
Both the Brennan and Marshall positions reveal the basic dilemma
facing a judge who wants to appeal to conventional morality to con-
demn the death penalty in a morally pluralistic society. Either the
conventional morality must be characterized as a mere proxy for the
judge's personal opinions, or it will fail to support the argument be-
cause an important segment of the public directly opposes the judge's
views. To resolve this dilemma, courts have developed "laundering
devices" as a means by which to "filter the actual, divergent moral
opinions of the community through the sieve of rationality."151 The
resulting judicial decisions are, and should be seen as, part of a
broader process of societal decisionmaking about morally controver-
sial matters. In this process, judges make their own substantive
choices, the responsibility for which they should not abdicate.1 52
5. OCS and Judicial "Cognitive Dissonance"
A great amount of cognitive dissonancel 5 3 exists between OCS and
what we now know 5 4 about mental illness, about the interplay be-
tween mental illness and criminal behavior, and about the disposition
of cases in which defendants both successfully and unsuccessfully
plead the insanity defense. At virtually all intellectual costs, we will
strain to fit new experiences into our preexisting theories of the
world. 5 5 Thus, almost autonomically, we reject much of the rich em-
pirical insanity defense database that has developed in the past decade,
150. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 295-300 (Brennan, J., concurring). Sadurski,
supra note 144, at 364, criticizes Brennan for his nonchalant use of data, charac-
terizing it as a "half empty, but not half full" type of argument. Id. at 365.
151. Sadurski, supra note 144, at 364, 366. Sadursli examines the methodology of con-
stitutional theorists guch as Harry Wellington and Michael Perry, and finds these
wanting, concluding that neither theorist can withstand confrontation of "moral
diversity in a community." Id. at 377. See also Perry, Abortion, the Public
Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process,
23 UCLA L. Rsv. 689 (1976); Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited-- Reflec-
tions On (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 417 (1976)[hereinafter
Due Process Revisited]; Sadurski, supra note 144, at 367-73'(discussing Welling-
ton, The Nature ofJudicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486 (1982)); Wellington, Com-
mon Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on
Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973). While Wellington, like Justice Marshall,
gives great deference to community standards, his selectivity in determining
which standard will count "make[s] the actually shared moral views and ideals
largely irrelevant." Sadurski, supra note 144, at 369.
152. Sadurski, supra note 144, at 397.
153. See Van Zandt, supra note 59, at 920 n.133 (discussing L. FESTiNGER, A THEORY OF
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957)).
154. Cf. Sherwin, supra note 85, at 737.
155. Van Zandt, supra note 59, at 918. See also, M. Perlin, supra note 19; Vidmar,
Retributive and Utilitarian Motives and Other Correlates of Canadian Attitudes
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simply because it does not fit our picture of the world.156 This is espe-
cially pernicious where so much of our OCS insanity defense "data" is
anecdotal and heuristic.157  Consequently, where insanity defense
decisionmaking is so animated by the vividness effect, our view of real-
ity will inevitably be distorted.158
Yet, the conflict between the insanity defense and conventional
community morality leads to other jurisprudential dissonances. Be-
cause the insanity defense appears to fly in the face of society's in-
formed OCS, it is received with the same sort of hostility that greeted
civil rights laws in the South twenty-five years ago; it is seen as "the
[coercive] imposition of an alien ideology by one [social] group on an-
other."'159 While many of the scholars and philosophers who write
about the insanity defense note this hostility, few see the hostility as
the inevitable outgrowth of the tension between the seemingly coer-
cive legal rules and the public's OCS.160
Majoritarian legal theory raises the troubling question of whose
community standards are at play. For example, one commentator re-
jects the argument that the Supreme Court can recognize its own stan-
dards as a proxy for community standards, but seems to cautiously
endorse in part the position that courts should be guided "by the atti-
tudes of our ethical leaders."161 However, he finds this latter position
Toward the Death Penalty, 15 CAN. PSYCHOLOGY 337 (1974); Vidmar & Dittenhof-
fer, supra note 149. See generally All Things Considered, supra note 81.
Empirical research supports the thesis that attribution theory is applied to
clinical judgments in attempts to perceive the dangerousness and treatability of
offenders. See Jackson, supra note 79; Quincey & Cyr, Perceived Dangerousness
and Treatability of Offenders: The Effects of Internal Versus External Attribu-
tions of Crime Causality, 1 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 458 (1986).
156. Van Zandt, supra note 59, at 916 n.115 (citing Pennington & Hastie, supra note
137). See, e.g., Russell, The Causal Dimension Scale: A Measure of How Individ-
uals Perceive Causes, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1137 (1982).
157. See supra Part IIC. Cf. Van Zandt, supra note 59, at 895 nn.7, 9 (citing R. UNGER,
SOCIAL THEORY 83 (1987))("Any complete story about nature and society lacks
the compelling character of the most compelling local narratives").
158. See Rosenhan, supra note 47. Compare, e.g., Hall, Science, Common Sense and
Criminal Law Reform, 49 IowA L. REv. 1044, 1051 (1964)(insanity defense deci-
sionmaking depends mostly on "ordinary experience").
159. Van Zandt, supra note 59, at 938. On the link between society's attitudes toward
the mentally disabled and toward racial, religious, and sexual minorities, see
Fleming, Shrinks vs. Shysters: The Latest Battle for Control of the Mentally 111, 6
LAw & HUM. BEIAV. 355, 356 (1982). The link between racism and "sanism" (ir-
rational prejudices toward the mentally disabled) is explored in Competency,
supra note 55.
160. See Rodgers & Hanson, The Rule of Law and Legal Efficacy: Private Values Ver-
sus General Standards, 27 W. POL. Q. 387, 393 (1974)("the individual's attachment
to a general standard seems to be a symbolic orientation that has little or no rela-
tion to specific legal disputes").
161. Sadurski, supra note 144, at 372-73 (discussing Due Process Revisited, supra note
151, at 730 n.195, and Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir.
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is still ultimately wanting because of the apparent indeterminacy of
conventional morality, suggesting that such indeterminacy can easily
be demonstrated by a comparison of the public positions of Jesse Jack-
son, Jerry Falwell, and John Rawls.162
Yet, assuming that the indeterminacy question can be answered,
are judges and other lawmakers in a position to either calculate or
reflect the attitudes of our ethical leaders? 63 Certainly, some of the
accumulated data on insanity defense jurisprudence suggests that
many judges are able to articulate such ethical leadership on this is-
sue.1 64 It is probably not coincidental that judicial OCS and public
OCS appear to be in substantial harmony on this issue. The role of
OCS in insanity defense jurisprudence can best be illustrated by the
following-
A political philosopher (or, for our purposes, a judge) must do more than
register actual moral opinions, but at the same time he must stop short of
stipulating his own views from "outside." How deeply is he allowed to dive in
order to ascertain these "deeper" understandings, in order to reconcile the
competing requirements of consistency in a moral system and of respect for
actual people who hold divergent views? Will they still recognize these
"deeper" opinions and understandings as their own? 165
We frequently refuse to "go deeper" when we unconsciously fear
what we may learn at a deeper level of exploration.66 A court's em-
brace of OCS serves as an effective brake so as to prohibit the judge
from "diving" into his or her own unconscious so as to reconcile the
competing requirements of consistency in a moral system. How ironic
it is that the paradigmatic OCS insanity defense opinions167 con-
1947)(Frank, J., dissenting)). Sadurski also appears to substantially approve of
Ronald Dworkin's criteria for a moral position in which one's reactions would
pass through an analytical test that would remove his or her prejudices, irrational
emotions, and rationalizations. Sadurski, supra note 144, at 369-70 (discussing R.
DwoRKcN, TAKING RIGHTS SERiousLY 248-53 (1977)).
162. Sadurski, supra note 144, at 373. See also Rodgers and Hanson, supra note 160, at
393 ("[W]hat we have found is that the individual's attachment to a general stan-
dard seems to be a symbolic orientation that has little or no relation to specific
legal disputes").
163. See infr note 248. This may be nothing more than a complicated way of asking
whether judges are at a sufficiently advanced stage of moral development to be
able to sort out their OCS from that of society. See M. Perlin, supra note 19
(discussing works of Lawrence Kohlberg, Jean Piaget, and Carol Gilligan).
164. Judge Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals is the clearest example of ajudge who has exerted such leadership. See, e.g., Wald, Disembodies Voices: An
Appellate Judge's Response, 66 TEM L. REV. 623, 627 (1988)(characterizing
Bazelon as one of our "greatest appellate judges").
165. Sadurski, supra note 144, at 388.
166. Repression of the unconscious is briefly explained in J. KATz, J. GoLDsTEIN & A.
DERsHowrrz, supra note 93, at 85-87.
167. See State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 210 A.2d 193 (1965); id. at 473-74, 210 A.2d at 204
(Weintraub, C.J., concurring). See also State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 83-84, 152 A.2d
50, 74 (1959)(Weintraub, C.J., concurring); Perlin, supra note 1, at 729-30.
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sciously articulate a position that refuses to "go deeper" and explore
the psychodynamic roots of unconscious motivations. Such willful
blindness,168 however, which is utterly reflective of the public's unin-
formed and distorted OCS, has served to shape insanity defense
jurisprudence.
6. A Twilight Zone: OCS and Individual Jury Verdicts
The public is disinterested in most legal rules;169 however, when a
legal rule deviates from common sense understandings, it fails to gain
support.170 The Hinckley verdict is the perfect example of insanity
defense decisionmaking, reflecting such deviation from OCS. Within
this "twilight zone," a significant consensus breaks down, and public
outrage at the apparent dissonance between the law and OCS is great-
est.171 When the public is confronted with the defense's use and its
apparent occasional role of exculpation of some whom we feel ought
to be punished, the defense's putative costs become apparent.
One commentator has suggested that insanity defense jurispru-
dence is subject to the law of "tensile strength" - that is, that when a
legal principle "is pushed beyond its tensile strength..., it will simply
fall apart."172 Justice Holmes's "hydraulic pressure" theory - that
judgment-distorting "immediate interests" can exercise a dynamic
force "before which even well settled principles of law will bend"s73 -
similarly reflects the dissonance caused by a Hinckey-type verdict.174
Recent empirical work by Professor Norman Finkel illuminates
this point.175 OCS has been demonstrated to be very powerful in in-
sanity decisionmaking in individual cases. Since the "wild beast" test,
insanity developments have reflected jurors' own intuitive, common-
sense understanding of what is sane and what is insane. This common
sense understanding has been consistently overlooked in the long run-
168. See Finer, Gates, Leon, and the Compromise of Adjudicative Fairness (Part II):
Of Aggressive Majoritarianism, Wilful Deafness, and the New Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 199, 205 (1986)(criticizing the current
Supreme Court for its intentional refusal to listen to party against whom it is
ruling in criminal procedure cases).
169. Van Zandt, supra note 59, at 935. See also Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723, 747 (1988).
170. Van Zandt, supra note 59, at 936 & n.199. Obvious examples suggested by Van
Zandt include the death penalty, abortion, and the prohibition on marijuana use.
171. As I discuss in other papers, it is precisely within this "twilight zone" that person-
ality factors become so important in the establishment of an insanity defense ju-
risprudence. See M. Perlin, supra note 19.
172. Fentiman, supra note 28, at 611 n.63.
173. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904). See also . Chris-
tiansen, supra note 24, at 46.
174. See generally Rodgers & Hanson, supra note 160, at 393.
175. For his most recent and comprehensive work, see N. FINKEL, supra note 7.
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ning scholarly and judicial debate that has surrounded insanity.176 In
empirical studies, the choice of a substantive test or the articulation of
any test at all has made little difference in mock jurors' determina-
tions. Evidence has shown that jurors interpret instructions to fit
their common sense, intuitive understanding of insanity.177 However,
the fact that the wording of tests makes little difference does not sup-
port the inference that juror decisionmaking is random. Rather, ju-
rors contextualize or frame specific cases differently, jurors construe
cases differently, and differences in case disposition are frequently a
reflection of an underlying problem of perspective, ie., a disagreement
in seeing or construing. The insanity construct may result in some
verdicts that raise questions about where the defendant might wind up
after the verdict. Additionally, concerns for the defendant and victim
come into play. As part of their OCS approach, some jurors may
weigh the victim's actions and character along with the defendant's
plea of insanity.178 A leading behavior scholar has articulated the
complexity of the determination:
"lnsanity," as jurors understand and construe it, is a multidimensional, com-
plex construct, or, in the vernacular of the construct theorists, is a superordi-
nate construct. The essence of insanity is not the same thing as any of its
correlated attributes, which may or may not be manifest in a particular de-
fendant. Thus, a person can be judged "insane" whether or not [he or she is]
manifesting clear or distorted perception[s], clear or distorted thinking, or
control or lack of control of [his or her] actions; the latter three - perception,
thinking, and volitional control - are attributes, lower level constructs - and
not the essence of insanity. Furthermore... a sound and coherent insanity
test - one that specifies the essence of insanity, and accords with our legal,
psychological, and commonsense notions of insanity - has not yet been devel-
oped, but certainly ought to be developed.1 7 9
176. Finkel, Malingering and Misconstruing Jurors' Insanity Verdicts: A Rebuttal; 1
FORENSIc REP. 97, 100 (1988)(legal test that does not adequately capture the es-
sence of insanity as understood by the ordinary juror invites disregarding or
reconstruing); Finkel & Handel, How Jurors Construe Insanity, 13 LAw & HuM.
BEHAv. 41 (1989).
177. Finkel, supra note 176, at 106-07. See generally N. FNKEL, supra note 7, at 157-76
(summarizing research).
178. Finkel, supra note 176, at 109-11. See also N. FMKEL, supra note 7, at 178 ("the
law's constructs fail to match well with the relevant and determinative constructs
of jurors"). On the general question of the role of the victim as a "stimulus of the
action for which the defendant seeks exculpation," see Horowitz, Justification
and Excuse in the Program of the Criminal Law, 49 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROBs. 109,
125 (1986); Landy & Aronson, supra note 73; Wexler, An Offense-Victim Ap-
proach to Insanity Defense Reform, 26 ARIz. L. REv. 17, 20-21 (1984).
179. Finkel, supra note 176, at 120-21 (manuscript at 29-30)(emphasis in original). The
test cases used by Finkel included defendants who were (1) epileptic, (2) chronic
alcoholics, (3) paranoid-schizophrenic, and (4) suffering from a traumatic stress-
induced disorder (a battered spouse case). Id. at 109. While jurors who find a
defendant NGRI may construe the case as "fitting" into an "insane person!' im-
age, those who find him guilty may construe it as "fitting" into a "normal crimi-
nal" image. Id. at 112.
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This same commentator applauded jurors' use of OCS as a "neces-
sary addition to the mix," and calls for a new test that 'harmonizes
legal, psychological, and common-sense perspectives." 8 0 Recognizing
that the common-sense perspective of jurors "remains a minor chord
at best" in the shaping of insanity defense law,"'8' he points out that
"commonsensical"-sounding insanity defense reformulations such as
those suggested by Stephen Morse and Michael Moore 8 2 "still lack a
sound empirical base."18 3
Yet, he also points out and appears somewhat disquieted by the fact
that jurors tend to shift their determinative constructs from case to
case. This creates another problem. Any new empirically-derived
common law insanity test might meet the same fate as other legal
tests. It might work well for one case but not the next; what we want
is an insanity test that works from case to case.
On reexamination, at least two hidden variable factors appear to
significantly animate juror decisionmaking- 1) the readiness of jurors
to use a third alternative verdict - Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI) -
when the verdict options are graded rather than dichotomous, and 2)
the presence of a "time/action" variable, ite., some jurors assess a de-
fendant's culpability at other times, as well as at the moment of the
criminal act.'8 4 Juror use of these variables is neither inexplicable nor
eccentric. Instead, it reflects an additional common sense cluster of
variables that would make a test upon which it is based likely to har-
monize with existing legal and psychological tenets rather than to nul-
lify them. 8 5 Such juror processes highlight the dominance of OCS in
insanity defense decisionmaking and underscore its further impor-
tance to our inquiry.
180. N. Finkel, De Jure and De Facto Insanity Tests 20 (paper delivered at the na-
tional conference of the American Psychological Association, August 1988).
181. N. Finkel, supra note 84, at 10. The relationships between jury behavior, OCS
and heuristic reasoning are discussed infra Part III B 2.
182. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 666-70 (discussing impact of moral philosophy on in-
sanity defense jurisprudence). See also M. MOORE, LAw AND PSYCHIATRY: RE-
THINKING THE RELATIONSHIP (1984); Morse, supra note 10.
183. N. Finkel, supra note 84, at 13 (emphasis in original).
184. Id. at 20-25. In an epilepsy case, based on People v. Grant, 71 Inl. 2d 551, 377
N.E.2d 4 (1978), a significant number of mock jurors focused on a time prior to
the criminal act, when the defendant, without consulting her doctor, chose to stop
taking her medication and then chose to go to a party where she had an alcoholic
drink. These decisions were evaluated by the mock jurors as having significant
effects on the defendant's capacity, mental condition, and actions at the moment
of the act. N. Finkel, supra note 84, at 24. See also Finkel & Handel, supra note
176, at 49-51. There is support for this position in other studies as well. See, e.g.,
White, supra note 72, at 125 n.11 (key variables in attempts to establish insanity
defense is whether defendant had previously sought help for his illness).
185. N. Finkel, supra note 84, at 25-26.
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III. OCS AND HEURISTIC REASONING IN ACTION: TWO
CASE STUDIES
A. Introduction
There has been virtually no legal scholarship devoted to the pri-
mary focus of this article: the impact of OCS and the use of heuristic
reasoning devices in the development of insanity defense jurispru-
dence. To illuminate these issues, it may be helpful to consider how
the underlying psychodynamic themes have been explored in other
collateral substantive areas.1 8 6 An examination of both the fields of
jury research and social science data research will reveal the applica-
bility of these interpretative devices and will help determine the ex-
tent to which use of these devices by insanity defense decisionmakers
helps explain researchers' conclusions. When reading this research, it
is necessary to keep in mind the influence of the underlying empirical
and social myths that have dominated these fields.
B. Jury Research
A significant amount of effort has already been expended on ques-
tions involving the unique role of juries in insanity defense cases in
making normative interpretations of the defendant's conduct.187 Do
jurors understand the technical language of substantive insanity de-
fense tests, or do they merely attempt to "do justice" by applying their
own "test"? Do jurors attempt to apply the law to the facts in such
cases (as they presumably do in alibi, self-defense, and identification
cases), or does their decisionmaking rest on an entirely different set of
variables? To what extent are jurors' "crime control" or "due pro-
cess" orientations significant in their determination of insanity de-
fense cases? If jurors do, in fact, misapply the relevant law, are we, as
a society, terribly upset about this development? To what extent has
the obscurity and mystification that has traditionally enveloped the
jury decision process contributed to the underlying confusion?188
While the research is neither complete nor unanimous, certain con-
clusions may be reached. While jurors are generally hostile to the in-
186. The meaning of "psychodynamics" in this context is explored carefully in Perlin,
supra note 1, at 607 n.32.
187. Sendor, supra note 128, at 1403. Sendor states:
[Tlhe jury's interpretation is informed, guided, and limited by the official
definition of the alleged crime established by legislation or common law,
the indictment or other charging document, evidence, rules of evidence,
jury instructions, and attorneys' arguments. The important point here,
however, is that the criminal law regards the jury's interpretation as the
authoritative interpretation of the relevant meaning of a defendant's
conduct. It is for the jury to interpret the defendant's behavior to deter-
mine whether he showed disrespect.
Id. at 1402-03.
188. See supma text accompanying notes 175-85.
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sanity defense,189 they are receptive to it in those rare instances when
they can empathize with the defendant. For instance, mothers accused
of killing their small children, police officers, and individuals about
whom jurors can say "there but for the grace of God go I" are dispro-
portionately acquitted by reason of insanity.19 0 These cases of seem-
ingly-paradoxical sympathy may reflect the reality that some insanity
defense jury verdicts should more appropriately be read as a version of
jury nullification.
1. Jury Nullification
Jury nullification is a jury's unreviewable power to acquit in disre-
gard of the applicable law.191 In those jurisdictions where courts ac-
cept its legitimacy,19 2 the nullification power leaves the jury with the
responsibility of deciding whether special factors present in the partic-
ular case compel the conclusion that the defendant's conduct was not
blameworthy.193 Jury nullification is especially likely to occur when
the substantive law fails to incorporate strong moral impulses such as
those traditionally encompassed by the insanity defense. 94
The very essence of the jury's function in its role as spokesman for
the community conscience in determining blameworthiness is vindi-
cated by jury nullification, and our understanding of community val-
189. See, e.g., Hans & Slater, supra note 102.
190. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 701-04.
191. See, e.g., Hornig v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920)(jury has "power
to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and fact"). See also sources cited in
Note, The Insanity Defense: Effects of an Abolition Unsupported By a Moral Con-
sensus," 9 AM. J. L. & MED. 471, 492 n.108, 493 n.111 (1984). See generally United
States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1005-06 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910
(1970)(prosecution for interference with operation of Selective Service System).
For the most recent empirical research, see Horowitz, Jury Nullification The
Impact of Judicial Instructions, Arguments, and Challenges on Jury Decision
Making, 12 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 439 (1988).
192. See Arenella, supra note 87, at 215 ("Indeed, juries may nullify the law because
their function extends beyond simply applying legal norms to the facts. They
may negate the substantive criminal law's clear application to a particular de-
fendant in cases in which they believe applying the legal standard would be un-
just"). But see Note, Chance, Freedom, and Criminal Liability, 87 COLUM. L.
REv. 125, 132 (1987)("unprincipled deference to community sensibilities is rarely
a satisfying solution to apparent conceptual incoherences"). The fear of jury nul-
lification may have been the reason for the exception to the equal grading made
for capital crimes and first degree felonies in the Model Penal Code. Id. at 131
n.34.
For sharply-conflicting views, see Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51
(1893); State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189, 213-22, 519 A.2d 1361, 1374-78 (Handler, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part).
193. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1140 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(Bazelon, J.,
dissenting)(in a Vietnam War protest case defendants entered offices of Dow
Chemical without permission and spilled containers of blood).
194. Note, supra note 191, at 492.
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ues and standards of blameworthiness is informed. 95 Under this
theory, the use of the nullification device mirrors all jury decision-
making as a reflection of the morality of the community and the stan-
dards of behavior it espouses.196
While nullification is usually discussed in what are popularly con-
sidered "political cases,"197 it has clearly been a historic element in
insanity defense decisionmaking, as well.198 In discussing juror re-
sponses to an infanticide case, Justice Cardozo stated, "No jury would
be likely to find a defendant responsible in such a case, whatever a
195. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(Bazelon, J., dis-
senting). See, e.g., W. WHITE, INsANr"Y AN THE CPmXMAL LAW 91 (1903)(Da
Capo Press ed. 1981)("the community, through the medium of its selected agent,
the jury... projects its own feelings upon the accused, so that from this point of
view responsibility stands for something which exist in the minds of the jury
rather than in that of the defendant"); Eule, The Presumption of Sanity: Burst-
ing the Bubble, 25 UCLA L. REV. 637, 661 (1978)("the jury often resolves the
question of sanity with reference to its own understanding of community con-
cepts of blameworthiness"). See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100
(1970) ("the essential feature of a jury obviously lies in... community participa-
tion and shared responsibility that results from the group's determination of guilt
or innocence"); State v. Ingenito, 87 N.J. 204, 211-12, 432 A.2d 912, 916 (19 8 1)(The
responsibility of the jury with respect to factual findings and ultimate guilt or
innocence is "so pronounced and preeminent that we accept inconsistent verdicts
that accrue to the benefit of a defendant." The jury may return a verdict of inno-
cence even in the face of "overwhelming evidence of guilt." The jury "serves in
criminal prosecutions as the "conscience of the community and the embodiment
of the common sense and feelings reflective of society as a whole").
196. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I- Provocation, Emotional Disturbance,
and the Model Penal Code, 27 B.C.L. REV. 243, 322 (1986)(characterizing this as
"common sensical 'rough justice,' not highly sophisticated"). See supra Part lID.
Other values inherent in jury nullification are discussed in Gobert, In Search of
the Impartial Jury, 79 J. Cnms. L. & CRIMINoLOGY 269, 300-02 (1988).
197. See, e-g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972). On the role of
jury nullification in the Bernhard Goetz trial, see supra text accompanying notes
34-39. See also Johnson, Jury's Power Comes Into Play In Goetz Trial, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 5, 1987, at 6, col. 4. There is some evidence that suggests that juries
convict at a higher rate in draft evasion cases when a war was popular than after
it lost popular support. See Horowitz, supra note 191, at 441 (discussing Levine,
The Legislative Role of Juries, 1984 AM. BAR FoUND. Ras. J. 605). The unique
role of the insanity defense in political trials is explored in M. Perlin, supra note
19. See also P. MORAN, supra note 27, at 139 (Judge Bazelon's position provides a
jurisprudential basis for the creation of a "political defense" for crime).
198. The insanity defense was comfortably accepted by juries in cases of defendants
who did not exhibit florid psychiatric symptomotology where jurors were espe-
cially sympathetic to the circumstances of the underlying crime. See Comment,
Recognition of the Honor Defense Under the Insanity Plea, 43 YALE L.J. 809, 813
(1934)(use of insanity defense where husband finds wife enflagrante delit gener-
ally accepted by jurors, but criticized for its potential "to confuse an already dis-
torted legal concept"). More recent research suggests, however, that there was
compelling evidence of insanity in many of the so-called honor defense cases. See
Ireland, Insanity and the Unwritten Law, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HFIST. 157, 172 (1988).
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Judge might tell them."199 Similarly, William A. White told of in-
sanity acquittals in cases involving the murder of the man who se-
duced a defendant's daughter and of a man who broke his long-term
promise to marry his mistress by whom he had fathered several chil-
dren; in both instances, "the written law offend[ed] the public con-
science, or the public standard of justice," and the jury disregarded it
"out of its collective sense of justice."200
While this has not been the subject of abundant scholarship,201 sev-
eral commentators have focused upon nullification as a "swing factor"
in the debate on the substantive limits of the insanity defense. It has
been suggested that the jury's potential use of the device in marginal
cases counsels in support of the abandonment of the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code use of a volitional prong.202 As there is
199. People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 328, 110 N.E. 945, 949 (1915)(emphasis added).
Professor Horowitz's research demonstrates that, when judges tell jurors that a
nullification verdict is permissible, information affects criminal trial verdicts,
with jurors moving "in the direction of mercy." Horowitz, supra note 191, at 450.
On juror response to infanticide pleas in general, see Steadman & Braff, Defend-
ants Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity, in MENTALLY DISABLED OFFENDERS: PER-
SPECTIVES IN LAw AND PSYCHOLOGY 109 (J. Monahan & H. Steadman eds. 1983).
On the role of "judicial chivalry" in such cases, see Perlin, supra note 1, at 702
n.483.
200. W. WHrrE, supra note 195, at 100-01. White had never known a criminal to escape
conviction on the plea of insanity where the evidence did not warrant such a ver-
dict except in such nullification cases. Id. at 3.
201. See Glantz, Withholding and Withdrawing Treatment- The Role of the Criminal
Law, 15 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 231,232-34 (1987)(juries acquitted defendant
on insanity grounds in six of nineteen reported "mercy killing" cases); Packer,
Homicide and the Insanity Defense: A Comparison of Sane and Insane Murder-
ers, 5 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 25, 34 (1987)(defendant killed "extremely abusive father";
judge entered NGRI verdict because defendant "did not qualify for any other ex-
culpatory verdict"). See also Kadish & Kadish, The Institutionalization of Con-
flict" Jury Acquittals, in LAw, JUSTICE AND THE INDnIDUAL IN SOCrETY:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 308, 316 (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds.
1977)(where jurors "appear to depart from the law and instructions," they may be
invoking their power of "legitimated interposition"). But see A. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 2, at 62-63; Gobert, supra note 196, at 304 (nullification allows the jury
to express its view of the moral blameworthiness of the defendant).
202. Bonnie, Morality, Equality, and &pertise: Renegotiating the Relationship Be-
tween Psychiatry and Law, 12 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 17 (1984).
However, there is now significant empirical doubt as to the accuracy of the ABA's
position that" 'morally correct' results are likely to be achieved more often under
a narrow test which does not include a volitional criterion." Keilitz, supra note 4,
at 297 (quoting ABA Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal
Justice, Proposed Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards 329 (1984), and not-
ing that the ABA's position may have been based on nothing more than "unveri-
fied observations of psychiatrists"). See Silver & Spodak, Dissection of the
Prongs of ALr: Retrospective Assessment of Criminal Responsibility by the Psy-
chiatric Staff of the Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center, 11 BULL. Am. ACAD. PSY-
CHIATRY & L. 383, 390 (1983)(contemporaneous empirical research has shown
some evidence that this truncation of the insanity defense may systematically ex-
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allegedly no objectifiable basis for such an inquiry, volitional insanity
defense litigation degenerates into individualized moral guesses. If
the factfinder is otherwise sympathetic to the defendant, the possibil-
ity arises that the claim will be accepted in morally inappropriate
cases, thus raising the discernible risk of "moral mistake at the
margins." 20 3
Yet, this view further acknowledges that, in the case of legally un-
recognized claims of situational excuse, e.g., the interfamilial murder
or the mercy killing, the insanity defense functions as a "safety valve,"
in other words, an instrument for nullification. Such aberrational
cases may illustrate an inevitable feature of any legal system. To the
extent a law "pinches too tightly," some safety valve will be found to
nullify that law.204
One of the defense's most implacable opponents, Dr. Abraham Hal-
pern, former president of the American Academy of Psychiatry and
Law, has similarly drawn on the nullification doctrine to support the
creation of a "justly acquitted" doctrine to "uncloset the conscience of
the jury."205 He posits that a defendant should not be held criminally
responsible if, "in the circumstances surrounding his unlawful act, his
clude patients with manic disorders whose illness is clearest in symptomatology,
most likely biological in origin, most eminently treatable, and potentially most
disruptive in penal detention).
203. Bonnie, supra note 202, at 17. But see Rogers, Assessment of Criminal Respons-
bility: Empirical Advances and Unanswered Questions, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY & L.
73, 78 (1987)(characterizing this position, on basis of available empirical evidence,
as "an intellectual charade played for the benefit of an uninformed public").
Elsewhere, Dr. Rogers has concluded that, when clinical assessment tools are
used appropriately, their reliability might be greater in volitional than in cogni-
tive determinations. R. Rogers, supra note 3, at 7. See also English, supra note
22, at 11 (on Congress's selective reading of the available scientific evidence so as
to allow it to conclude that psychiatrists were unable to understand such discrimi-
nations).
It must be emphasized that Bonnie's position is not a unanimous one on this
point. See, eg., Silver & Spodak, supra note 202, at 390; English, supra note 22, at
40-41 (supporting Silver and Spodak's findings).
204. Bonnie, supra note 202, at 18.
205. Halpern, Uncloseting the Conscience of the Jury - A Justly Acquitted Doctrine,
52 PSYCHIATRY Q. 144,154-55 (1980). Such a doctrine differs from the "justly re-
sponsible" test suggested in the United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969,1031,1034
(D.C. Cir. 1972)(Bazelon, J. concurring). Under the "justly responsible" test, "a
defendant is not responsible if at the time of his unlawful conduct his mental or
emotional processes or behavior controls were impaired to such an extent that he
cannot be held responsible for his act." Id. at 1032. Halpern explains that the
"justly responsible" doctrine would require proof of some sort of "mental disease
or defect" or "impairment of mental processes with its inescapable medical impli-
cations." Halpern, supra, at 152. Further, a narrow construction of "at the time of
the act or conduct" would confine the analysis of the mental state of the defend-
ant to an unrealistically brief time frame. Id. Finally, automatic confinement
would still follow on the heels of the alternative approach. Id. at 153.
For earlier alternatives of the "justly responsible" test, see id. at 148-50 (dis-
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mental or emotional processes or behavioral controls were functioning
in such a manner that he should be justly acquitted."206
Such a doctrine that refers to the functioning of mental processes
without a showing of "disease" eschews the notion of a mental state at
the precise time of the act and allows the factfinder to take into ac-
count the entire gamut of relevant factors that influenced the defend-
ant. This doctrine would allow the expert witness to "really talk
'unfettered by arbitrary legal formulae', and would allow the jury 'to
confront the causes of criminal conduct in a way that might teach us
all something about human behavior.' "207
While these analyses are provocative and illuminating,208 some
fairly serious underlying substantive issues remain.209 Jurors' tenden-
cies to ignore medical evidence and legal tests may equally demon-
strate the sort of freakish inconsistency that led to the Supreme
Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia.210 In Furman, the Court de-
cided that the administration of the death penalty constituted cruel
and unusual punishment and that it might reflect nothing more than
"jury vigilantism." 2 l1 The suggestion that jurors must simply deter-
mine whether the discrepancy between the defendant's mental capac-
ity and that of a "normal" individual is sufficient to negate
cussing the Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1953) and
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, alternative (a) to § 4.01(1)(Tent. Draft No. 4 1955)).
206. Halpern, supra note 205, at 147, 154-55.
207. Id. at 153-55 (quoting, in part, United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1034 (D.C.
Cir. 1972)(Bazelon, J., concurring), and Douglas, The Durham Rule. A Meeting
Ground for Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 41 IowA L. REV. 485,489 (1956)). Halpern,
supra note 205, at 155, qualifies this by limiting its application to "at least some
cases of ordinarily law-abiding and honest persons." But see Bonnie, supra note
202, at 18 (expressing some concern over this formulation, cautioning that a prin-
ciple of situational excuse must be structured "to frame the moral inquiry with-
out opening the door to wholesale individualization of the standards of criminal
liability"). Empirical mock jury research shows no significant differences be-
tween jurors given some legal instructions and those given no specific instruc-
tions at all. Finkel & Handel, Jurors and Insanity: Do Test Instructions
Instruct? 1 FORENSIC REP. 65, 75 (1988).
208. As a retentionist, I find Dr. Halpern's formulation especially appealing, but only
as an alternative to a "standard" insanity defense in what Professor Bonnie calls
"situational excuse cases," not as a replacement.
209. See also Note, supra note 191, at 493 (since nullification provides no vehicle for
the introduction of expert testimony, the jury may not recognize defendant's in-
capacity, and the jury may be unaware of its prerogative to acquit). Cf. State v.
Ragland, 105 N.J. 189, 213-22, 519 A.2d 1361, 1374-78 (1986)(Handler, J., concur-
ring in part & dissenting in part).
210. 408 U.S. 238, 306, 310 (1972)(Stewart, J., concurring)(the eighth and fourteenth
amendments cannot allow the infliction of a sentence of death under legal sys-
tems that permit this unique penalty to be wantonly imposed).
211. Spring, The Insanity Defense in a Public Needs Perspective, 4 DET. C.L. REv. 603,
610 (1979).
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responsibility21 2 similarly ignores the dangers of arbitrary and dis-
criminatory judgments inherent in decisional discretion.2 13
In addition, critics may lose sight of an important underlying psy-
chodynamic issue that bears repeating- in its role as "conscience of the
community," jurors will continue to make judgments based on their
ordinary common sense vision of rough justice2 ' 4 as to who ought to be
punished.215 Insanity defense jurisprudence has developed in large
part in response to outrageous verdicts that shock the community's
conscience - the post-Hinckle shrinkage and the public's endorse-
ment of the "wild beast" test. 21 6 Nullification becomes an issue only
in that minute handful of cases where the jury's empathy lies with the
defendant because of the defendant's persona,2 17 his or her role as so-
cial "victim," or because of special circumstances surrounding the of-
fense, i.e., the defendant's concern for a dying relative in perpetrating
a mercy killing. In such cases, we "trust" jurors to "do the right
212. See generally H. FINGARErE & A. HASE, MENTAL DSABMEumS AND CR NAL
RESPoNsiBImT (1979).
213. Ingber, Ideological Boundaries ofCriminal Respnsibility, 27 UCLA L. REV. 816,
831 (1980) (reviewing EL FINGARETTE & A. HASSE, supra note 212). Ingber states:
All [the authors] suggest is that the jury make a common sense deter-
mination of whether the defendant, from a practical lay viewpoint, had
the ability to take the law into account before acting. This standard pro-
vides no criteria for evaluation, no limits or direction to aid in avoidance
of the abuses of discretion. At most it constitutes an after-the-fact ra-
tionalization for judgments already reached. The jury is allowed to focus
on the lowest level of generality - that of the specific actor - and the
process is consequently subject to the vicissitudes inherent in the emo-
tionality and drama of a trial. The vagaries of common sense determina-
tions are made apparent by the virtual impossibility of conceiving a
situation in which a jury's determination of rationality would be over-
turned on appeal.
Jurors have thus been granted the opportunity (or burdened with the
responsibility) of making an unstructured moral inquiry. Not only may
such an inquiry be perceived as inadequately general and thus illegiti-
mate, but it may also be insensitive to the subtleties of the juror's role.
Id. at 832.
Compare Hassett, Absolutism in Causation, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 683, 714
(1987)(expressing approval of the MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2)(b)(1972) attempt
to put the issue of causation "squarely to the jury's sense of justice").
214. Singer, supra note 196, at 322.
215. Eule, supra note 195, at 661.
216. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 640; Roberts, Golding & Fincham, supra note 8, at 226.
See supra text accompanying note 9.
217. For recent important research into the personal factors that affect death penalty
jurors, see Geimer & Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death:- Operative Fac-
trs in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 Am. J. CRIM. L. 1, 4041, 51-52
(1988)(32% of all actual death penalty jurors interviewed saw the defendant's de-
meanor as an operative factor in their determination as to whether to recommend
life imprisonment or death; where defendants appeared unimpressive, passive,
unremorseful, or emotionless, death sentences were returned).
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thing."218
Ironically, if it were not for the ultra-rigid limitations on the sub-
stantive test that have grown out of fear of "wrong verdicts," 219 the
entire nullification debate would probably never have arisen in this
context. It is only because the insanity defense has been "over-
shrunk" in response to the jury's articulation of an OCS-based com-
munity conscience that nullification needs be employed as a
compensatory device in those rare cases where the community's con-
science rebels at a guilty verdict.22 0 Until we understand why this is
and why the community's conscience is as it is, reliance on nullifica-
tion will simply be a temporal palliative.
2. Jury Research and Psychodynamic Conclusions
Lawyers have always accepted as a given the mysticism inherent in
the jury system and how little we really know about what goes on in
actual jury deliberations.221 Discussing the impact of this mystifica-
tion on the trial in insanity defense cases, several commentators
concluded:
We simultaneously deify and degrade jurors. We entrust them with the
awesome responsibility of deciding a defendant's guilt or innocence. We attri-
bute to them the superhuman quality of being able to ignore their own back-
grounds and biases and to approach the trial tabula rasa. We pretend they are
able to disregard all statements made at trial that the judge tells them to dis-
218. Cf. Pea v. United States, 397 F.2d 627, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1967)(Burger, J., dissenting
on rehearing) ('Tbis case is but another manifestation in this court of a tendency
... to follow the Jerome Frank... school of thought which profoundly mistrusts
juries, and prefers fact finding by one judge whose conclusions can more readily
be upset by appellate judges.")(footnote and citation omitted).
Given the jury's role as a "buffer against government oppression," the need
for accuracy in criminal verdicts must be "balanced by the jury's role as the link
between contemporary community values and the penal system." Note, In
Search of Madness in the Sixth Amendment, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 131,
140, 152 (1983). But see Gobert, supra note 196, at 305 ("Nor can the principles
[animating jury nullification] simplistically be equated with community values.
Community values may be the irrational product of majoritarian prejudices and
bigotry"). See generally Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of
Rights for the Mentally Disabled: The Last Frontier? 20 LOY. L.A.L. REv. 1249,
1258 (1987)(on ways that Supreme Court decisions involving the mentally dis-
abled reinforce majoritarian values).
219. See Bonnie, supra note 202, at 17 (concern for "moral mistakes" inherent in po-
tential volitional prong acquittals).
220. Cf. A. GOLDsTEwN, supra note 2, at 90 (problem with finding a substantive formula
that keeps the responsibility exemption closely attuned to what the public can
accept).
221. See, e.g., Tanford & Tanford, supra note 28, at 759-71 (on jury behavior). Leading
scholars in the area concede that the scientific study of groups such as juries "is in
its infancy." R Hastie, Theoretical Maps of the Road to Consensus in Small
Groups 2 (unpublished manuscript). On the legal system's need for "masks," see
Perlin, supra note 1, at 682-88.
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regard. We assume that they are able to understand and apply the most com-
plex legal formulae - ones that philosophers and lawyers have debated for
centuries. Nevertheless, we camouflage jurors' importance to the criminal
trial, telling them they are merely factfinders and that the judge will decide
the defendant's disposition...
Is society served by its continued tolerance of the mystique surrounding
real juror deliberations. We think not. Efforts to investigate these obscure
rites should be encouraged and expanded.2 22
This notion of "camouflage" is an important one for our purposes.
So much of our insanity defense jurisprudence serves as a camouflage
for hidden feelings, drives, and desires that are certainly present in
juror decisionmaking. Our shrouding juror deliberations with such a
mystique simply keeps us one step further away from understanding
the psychodynamic processes at work in insanity defense cases.
Until very recently, there has been little serious interest in
whether the choice of a substantive defense test makes an actual em-
pirical differene.223 Common wisdom had been that the test em-
ployed really does not matter in "real life."224 Generally, an artful
expert witness can shape his or her testimony to fit any test,225 espe-
cially where the defendant is "clearly psychotic."226
Recent jury research helps illuminate some of these intuitive con-
clusions.227 This research shows that jurors who are given no instruc-
tions decide cases similarly to jurors who are instructed on the law,
and, when such mock jurors are given varied instructions, no one spe-
cific text instruction produces discriminably different verdicts than
222. Morris, Bozzetti, Rusk & Read, Whither Thou Goest? An Inquiry Into Jurors'
Perceptions of the Consequences of a Successful Insanity Defense, 14 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1058, 1078 (1977).
223. On what else makes a difference, see J. ROBrrscHEa, PURSUIT OF AGasmmm.
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 66 (1966)(economic factors, the tensions prevailing in
society, and the understanding in society of psychiatric concepts, are influential in
determining the particular insanity test).
224. See generally A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2; Gray, The Insanity Defense: Historical
Development and Contemporary Relevance, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 559, 572-73
(1972). But see R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANIT 72 (1967)(in
incest trials, experimental jurors deliberating under M'Naghten were signifi-
cantly less likely to enter NGRI verdicts than those instructed under the "prod-
uct test" of Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), or those who
received no specific test instructions).
225. As previously discussed, there is some evidence that limiting the ALI test might,
paradoxically, increase psychiatric participation in criminal trials. Silver &
Spodak, supra note 202, at 389.
226. Bromberg & Cleckley, supra note 126, at 731.
227. A new "generation" of empirical inquiry into jurors' perspectives on the insanity
defense is now resulting in data on the jurors' "intuitive understanding of mental
disease, responsibility, culpability, punishment and treatment prior to deliberat-
ing with fellow jurors." See, e.g., N. FnKEL, supra note 7; Finkel & Handel,
supra note 176; Finkel & Handel, supra note 207. On the connection between
attribution theory and jury behavior, see N. FINKEL, supra note 7, at 168.
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any other.2 28 These findings remain constant even where the Insanity
Defense Reform Act (IDRA), a reduced version of M'Naghten is added
as an alternative. Generally, test instructions have not produced sig-
nificantly different verdict patterns.229
Notwithstanding this fairly clear empirical picture,230 the choice of
an insanity test remains important for other normative and instru-
mental reasons. The process by which the insanity defense has
shrunk reflects widespread public and judicial dissatisfaction with the
defense. Thus, it is likely that the narrower "reform" tests help create
an atmosphere in which insanity defenses will be contemplated even
more rarely in the future. In addition, as the substance of the new
federal IDRA is even narrower than the M'Naghten test, it is likely
that jury instructions on the IDRA will be even narrower.23 ' This is
especially important given the new interest in novel "syndrome"
cases. 232 These syndrome cases have all the elements that are proto-
typic of the sort that appeared to animate the cries for reform:233 non-
228. Finkel & Handel, supra note 207, at 75 (The authors note: "this outcome is not
what judges, jurists, psychological experts, and legislators had in mind."). Accord
Pasewark, Randolph & Bieber, Insanity Plea- Statutory Language and Trial Pro-
ceedings, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 399 (1984)(no difference found regarding rate
and success of insanity plea or disposition of insanity acquittal cases in jurisdic-
tion which employed M'Naghten, the Model Penal Code rule with a bifurcated
trial, and the Model Penal Code rule with a single-phase trial sequentially over
six year period). See also N. FDN.E, supra note 7, at 160.
Finkel's findings have been consistently found regardless of whether jurors
are given the "wild beast" test or M'Naghten; the "wild beast" test or M'aghten-
plus-irresistible impulse; or the "wild beast" test, M'Naghten, AL, or Durham.
N. FINEL, supra note 7, at 59-60; Finkel & Handel, supra note 176, at 43-44. On
the other hand, when jurors are offered the "diminished responsibility" alterna-
tive, that verdict choice is used selectively, discriminately, and appropriately. See
N. Finkel & K. Duff, The Insanity Defense: Giving Jurors a Third Option
(1988) (unpublished manuscript).
229. N. FNMEL, supra note 7, at 177; Finkel, The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984:
Much Ado About Nothing, 7 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 403 (1989).
230. Professor Finkel emphatically does not draw nihilistic conclusions from this data.
His interpretation that jurors' intuitive, common sense understanding of what is
sane and what is insane is finally determinative. Finkel, supra note 176, at 100.
231. IDRA limits the insanity defense to those with "severe" mental disorders. 18
U.S.C. § 20 (1988). In Finkel's sample using the IDRA test, the phrase "severe
mental disease or defect" was not further defined. Finkel, supra note 229, at 407.
Were this phrase to be given greater content, it might be hypothesized that there
would be some statistically significant variation.
232. See M. Perlin, Hinckley's Other Victims: The Implications of a Shrunken In-
sanity Defese for the Trial of Novel Cases (unpublished paper in progress). One
of the rare judicial mentions of heuristics in the insanity defense literature occurs
in United States v. Torniero, 735 F.2d 725, 733 (2d Cir. 1984)(quoting with ap-
proval, American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140
Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 681 (1983)("Persons with antisocial personality disorders
(such as compulsive gambling) should, at least for heuristic reasons, be held ac-
countable for their behavior")).
233. See Resnick, Perceptions of Psychiatric Testimony: A Historical Perspective on
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"crazy" looking defendants, 23 4 the presence of "planful" behavior, the
potential presence of "political" issues, and suspicious, "soft" expert
testimony.235
There is also some evidence in cases involving idiosyncratic physio-
logical expert testimony that suggests that the choice of test has tradi-
tionally made a difference. 23 6 Finally, a few available more recent
"real life" empirical studies do seem to indicate that the choice of test
may be more significant than has been traditionally believed.23 7
On the other hand, it appears fairly clear that jurors exhibit a star-
tlingly low comprehension of the court's charge,238 especially in in-
the Hysterical Invective, 14 BuLL. Am. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 203, 208 (1986).
See also Note, The Syndrome Syndrome: Problems Concerning the Admissibility
of E pert Testimony on Psychological Profiles, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 1035, 1045-46
(1985) (discussing impact of judges' "personal perceptions regarding the substance
of syndromes" on determination of admissibility of expert testimony). Several
courts that have allowed the introduction of testimony on "battered spouse syn-
drome" explicitly noted that such testimony was "counterintuitive" to jurors'
senses of OCS. See, eg., State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 716 P.2d 563 (1986); State v.
Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d 263, 273-74, 751 P.2d 1165, 1171 (1988). See also Perlin, Tak-
ing Syndromes Seriously: State v. Ciskie, "Ordinary Common Sense" and the
Limits of Epert Testimony, 14 NEWSLETER Am. AcAD. PSYCHATRY & L. 48
(1989).
234. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 724-27.
235. Golding & Roesch, The Assessment of Criminal Responsibility: A Historical Ap-
proach to a Current Controversy, in HANDBOOK OF FORENsIC PSYcHOLOGY 395,
400 (I. Weiner & A. Hess eds. 1987). Suspicion in such cases is not new. See J.
HASLAM, JURISPRUDENCE AS IT RELATES To INsANITY ACCORDING TO THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 4 (1817) (psychiatrist should not "palm on the court the trash of med-
ical hypothesis as the apology for crime").
236. See Note, Epilepsy and the Alternatives for a Criminal Defense, 27 CASE W. REs.
L. REV. 771, 790 (1977). Accord Kiofas & Yandrasits, "Guilty But Mentally Ill"
and the Jury Trial A Case Study, 24 CRIM. L. BuLL. 424, 441 (1988)(when asked
to predict what would have happened to the defendant if GBMI were not a ver-
dict option, all of the jurors believed that he would have been found guilty). Cf.
Finkel & Handel, supra note 176, at 49-51 (in a mock case involving epilepsy de-
fense, jurors focused primarily on "nonculpable acts" (72.4%), "could not control
impulses and actions" (48.1%), and "no evil motive" (45.5%), as factors supporting
their verdict choices). N. Finkel, supra note 84, at 24 (in assessing culpability of
insanity defendant in epilepsy case, a significant number of jurors focused upon
an earlier time, when the defendant on her own, without consulting her doctor,
chose to stop taking her medication and chose to go to a party where she had an
alcoholic drink").
237. See Keilitz, supra note 4, at 298-303 (reviewing five studies on the effects of statu-
tory changes on the success of the insanity defense). See also Steadman, supra
note 30, at 68-69 (changes in NGRI release standards appeared to have "major
ramifications" in New York).
238. Arens, Granfield & Susman, Jurors, Jury Charges, and Insanity, 14 CATH. U.L.
REv. 1, 25 (1965). See generally Steele & Thornburg, supra note 99, at 83-87;
Tanford & Tanford, supra note 28, at 749. Some of the blame for jurors' lack of
comprehension can be laid at the feet of the trial judges who, in one post-Durham
District of Columbia study, improperly avoided the "product" language de-
manded by that case, and whose charges, instead "still reflected an overwhelming
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sanity defense cases.239 In reporting their study of the responses of
229 college psychology and sociology students (a sample which, intui-
tively, is better educated than any typical jury cross-section) 24 0 to
mock jury instructions, researchers found that in 75% of the delibera-
tions, only one-third of the jurors could recall the judge's charge with
"significant accuracy." In addition, comprehension was not signifi-
cantly increased regardless of the quality of the jury. Most shock-
ingly, the jurors deliberated under the operative presumption of the
defendant's guilt. 4 1 Unless jurors clearly understand judicial charges,
they cannot return verdicts that give effect to the legislative formula-
tions of a substantive insanity defense test.2 42
Hidden beneath the surface in these studies is a crucial psychody-
namic issue: the significance of those underlying psychological and
personality traits of jurors that animate their decisionmaking. As ju-
rors have significantly different ethnic, economic class, and educa-
tional backgrounds than do medical and academic experts,2 4 3 they
number of symbols suggestive of the cognitive [M'Naghten] formulation." Arens
& Susman, supra note 101, at 33.
239. See Eule, supra note 195, at 661 n.121 (jury studies consistently reveal that the
accuracy rate in recalling an insanity formulation is the lowest of any material
heard during the trial).
240. See, e.g., Field & Barnett, Simulated Jury Trials: Students vs. 'Real' People as
Jurors, 104 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 287-93 (1978)(students more lenient in setting
sentences for defendants in mock trials). On the problems raised by what is collo-
quially called "college sophomore research," see Kramer & Kerr, Laboratory
Simulation and Bias in the Study of Juror Behavior, 13 LAw & HUM. BERAv. 89
(1989); Tanford & Tanford, supra note 28, at 754. But see Jackson supra note 79,
at 118 (even lawyers - who as a group are better educated than either an actual
true jury or a college sophomore sample - are prone to show the same heuristic
biases as lay people in making similar judgments based on the same information).
241. Arens, Granfield & Susman, supra note 238, at 22-26. See also Arens & Susman,
supra note 101, at 17 (jury instructions are needlessly wordy and fail to communi-
cate the notion of the acceptability of non-psychotic mental illnesses as a valid
basis for insanity acquittals in "clear and compelling language").
242. Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion'A Threat to Justice, 59 JuDicATuRE 478, 483
(1976). See also Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable.- A
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1306, 1359
(1979)(if jurors do not properly understand the laws that they are required to use
in reaching their verdicts, it is possible that many verdicts are reached either
without regard to the law or by using improper law); Elwork, Sales & Alfini,
Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It? 1 LAW & HUM.
BEHAv. 163, 178 (1977)(unless the situation is corrected, juries will continue to
reach decisions arbitrarily, and countless litigants will be denied their constitu-
tional right to a fair trial); Steele & Thornburg, supra note 99, at 99 (studies show
juror comprehension of pattern instructions "to be so low as to be dysfunc-
tional"). See generally V. HANS & N. VMMAR, supra note 31, at 193-94.
243. On the impact of presumption instructions on juror deliberation in insanity cases,
see Note, The Improper Use of Presumptions in Recent Criminal Law Adjudica-
tion, 38 STAN. L. REV. 423, 450 (1986), which concludes that the "authority" with
which the presumption instruction is communicated can sufficiently reorient the
jurors' decisionmaking processes in a way that "seriously challenges the jury's
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may be less tolerant of and more impassioned by deviance.24 4 Such
fear of jurors' expected "excessive responses to deviant behavior" has
led scholars to fear virtually unlimited jury discretion and to caution
against the "facade of jury neutrality."245
There is some case law support for this position in other criminal
procedure areas. In Jackson v. Denno,246 a voluntariness of confession
case, the Supreme Court found that a jury may be "ill-suited to do
justice to a defendant's full constitutional entitlement."2 4 7 This con-
clusion reflects due process "trumping" OCS.248 More recent
obligation to act as the 'conscience of the community' and to draw upon ordinary
common sense in making its decisions."
Other studies have demonstrated that jurors' pre-existing beliefs regarding
racial and gender characteristics affected their determinations of guilt and inno-
cence most strongly in cases where evidence was equivocal. See Fraher, supra
note 106, at 339 (discussing Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror
Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 133
(1979)). On jurors' responses to novel scientific evidence, see Note, The Frye Doc-
trine and Relevancy Approach Controversy: An Empirical Evaluation, 74 GEo.
L.J. 1769, 1783-85 (1986)[hereinafter Note, Frye Doctrine](discussing the inter-
play between heuristic reasoning devices and juror response to expert testimony
in cases where jurors feel well informed).
244. Ingber, supra note 213, at 835 & n.109 (relying on T. ADoRNO, E. FRENKEL-BRUNs-
waK, D. LEViNSON & R. SANFORD, THE AUTHORARAN PERSONALITY (1950), the
epochal study of American anti-Semitism in the 1940's). See generally M. Perlin,
supra note 19.
245. Ingber, supra note 213, at 836 & n.110. For Ingber's views on the critical issue of
the role of crime in animating jurors' "passionate" response to deviance, see id. at
842-48. On the significance of jurors' views on the attractiveness of the victim and
the character of the criminal as a determinant in their decisionmaking, see Landy
& Aronson, supra note 73.
On the impact of jurors' perceptions of expert testimony, see Tanton, Jury
Preconceptions and Their Fffect on Expert Testimony, 24 J. FoRENsic Sci. 681,
690 (1979)(most jurors "have a remarkably precise, albeit inaccurate, visual pre-
conception of the forensic scientist in the courtroom"). See also Rosenthal, Na-
ture of Jury Response to the Expert Witness, 28 J. FORENSIC Sci. 528 (1983)(jurors
can be swayed by secondary information related by witnesses themselves by the
peripheral aspects of the message and by the general environment of the court-
room). See generally Saks & Wissler, Legal and Psychological Bases of Expert
Testimony: Surveys of the Law of Jurors, 2 BEHAv. SCe. & L. 435 (1984); Note,
Frye Doctrine, supra note 243.
246. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
247. Sherwin, supra note 85, at 763. The database that helped support this conclusion
included Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 200-03 (1960)(mentally disabled de-
fendant interrogated for at least eight hours of sustained questioning, jury had
accepted confession as not coerced) and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-83
(1936)(detailing whipping and torture of defendant; jury had accepted confession
as not coerced).
248. While Sherwin, supra note 85, at 764, questions the basis for assuming that a
court has superior expertise to a jury in determining the voluntariness of a puta-
tively-coerced confession, this skepticism must be evaluated on two additional
levels. First, it is necessary to consider the field of moral psychology, which may
yield some very specific potential answers regarding the question of whether
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Supreme Court decisions show significant backsliding from this posi-
tion.249 However, the Jackson court's concern is still important.
There are certain due process values that are not intuitively endorsed
by lay persons on an OCS basis, a reality exacerbated by the frequent
employment of heuristics in the way we weigh such cases. 25o
Other empirical research corroborates these concerns. Jurors
more concerned with crime control values are more likely to reject
insanity pleas, while those who take due process concerns more seri-
ously are more likely to return a Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity
(NGRI) verdict. 251 Conviction proneness may also be revealed by an
individual's attitude toward the legitimacy of the insanity defense.252
These findings may help explain why female jurors appear to respond
more favorably to mental disability defenses, as some evidence indi-
cates that women may be more concerned with due process and men
with controlling crime.25 3
judges are, or at least are expected to be, at a higher stage of "moral develop-
ment". See M. Perlin, supra note 19. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 169, at 749 &
n.153 (discussing the idea that certain "elite groups," including judges, are the
reasoning class.). See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DSTRUST 59 n.** (1980).
Second, an objective consideration of the factual underpinnings of early con-
fession cases reflects the accuracy of the Jackson Court's position. Thus, at the
time of Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281 (1936), the fact that police officers
brutalized indigent black defendants might have been (under OCS principles)
perfectly appropriate to white Mississippi jurors, but not to a majority of
Supreme Court justices who have a different set of intuitions, based on their dif-
ferent ethnic, class, and educational backgrounds. Ingber, supra note 213, at 835.
249. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), discussed infra Part III C 3. See
generally Woolhandler, supra note 142, at 121 (court ignores social science data
that appears to "trump" OCS).
250. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 50, at 347-48.
251. Ellsworth, Bukaty, Cowan & Thompson, The Death Qualified Jury and the De-
fense of the Insanity, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 81 (1984).
252. Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-Qual-
ifled Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 7
n.32 (1970). In response to the statement, '"Te plea of insanity is a loophole al-
lowing too many guilty men to go free," responses broke down in the following
manner as to the respondents' conviction proneness (CP) and innocent proneness
(IP) on death penalty attitudes:
CP IP
Strongly favor 82 8
Favor 238 42
Oppose 147 45
Strongly oppose 40 26
Id. at 8 n.34. See also White, supra note 72, at 125 (death-qualified subjects more
likely to see insanity defense as "a ruse and an impediment" to conviction).
253. White, The Mental Illness Defense in the Capital Penalty Hearing, 5 BEHAV. SC.
& L. 411, 418 (1987). But see Ford, supra note 48, at 17-18 (discussing studies
finding women more conviction-prone than men). Compare Faulstich, Effects
Upon Social Perceptions of the Insanity Plea, 55 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 183
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To summarize, a wide variety of research on jury behavior reveals
the pervasive use of both OCS and heuristic reasoning in all aspects of
insanity defense decisionmaking in the typical cases and the rare nulli-
fication cases alike. Until we are willing to unshroud the jury's articu-
lation of its view of the community's conscience and to carefully
identify the cognitive potholes into which heuristic thinking fre-
quently leads jurors in their decisionmaking, we will continue to fruit-
lessly grind our wheels over the precise terminology of substantive
insanity defense tests, as we remain blind to the underlying psycholog-
ical motivations that truly matter in insanity defense cases.
C. Social Science Research
The past few years have seen an important resurgence of interest
in the impact of social science research on legal decisionmaking.254
Scholars have begun to reexamine the proper role of social science
data in the judicial process. Judicial opinions of enormous significance
have turned on the degree to which such data could appropriately be
absorbed. While few of these new academic developments have fo-
cused on the issues of concern here,255 other empiricists have begun to
investigate aspects of insanity defense decisionmaking that may shed
additional light on how resolution of the underlying psychodynamic
questions are distorted by OCS and heuristic decisionmaking.
1. The Role of Social Science Data
The Supreme Court's relationship with social science data can be
traced to Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden. Marshall
asserted that "all America understands and has traditionally under-
(1984)(female jurors more likely to find defendant not responsible, but only
where evidence of psychiatric history available). In considering the results of an-
other simulated study, Professor Finkel and his colleagues stressed the impor-
tance of the lay perspective of "intuitive, common sense understanding of
insanity, responsibility, culpability, punishment, and treatment." Finkel, Shaw,
Bercaw & Koch, supra note 100, at 92. See also N. FINKEL, supra note 7, at 164-67.
See generally French, Boundary Maintenance and Capital Punishment" A Socio-
logical Perspective, 5 BEHAv. ScI. & L. 423 (1987); White, supra note 72.
254. See, e.g., Kerr, Social Science and the U.S. Supreme Court, in THE IMPAcr OF
SOCLAL PSYCHOLOGY ON PROCEDURAL JusnCE 56 (M. Kaplan ed. 1986); Monahan
& Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Sci-
ence in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986); Walker & Monahan, Social Facts:
Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 877 (1988); Tremper,
Sanguinity and Disillusionment Where Law Meets Social Science, 11 LAW &
HUM. BEHAv. 267 n.1 (1987). See generally D. HoRowrrz, THE COURTS AND So-
CLAL PoLicY (1977).
255. On the use of social science data to determine commonly-accepted meanings of
responsibility, see Sandelts & Hamilton, Is There a 'Common Law' of Responsibil-
ity? The Effect of Demographic Variables on Judgments of Wrongdoing, 11 LAW
& Hum. BEHAV. 277 (1987).
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stood the word commerce to comprehend navigation." However, he
cited no data and demanded on faith acceptance of his expertise on the
state of public opinion and his ability to measure the public's views.?
While Louis Brandeis's brief in Muller v. Oregon is generally seen as
the Court's initial confrontation with social science data,25 7 Gibbons is
the true forerunner. Since Marshall's time, progress in utilization of
social science data by the Supreme Court has not kept pace, even re-
motely, with the progress in social science skills for gathering and in-
terpreting such data.258
2. Social Science and the Insanity Defense
While scholars have recently considered critically the impact of so-
cial science data on child custody decisionmaking and its use in death
penalty cases,2 5 9 in general, little attention has been paid to the spe-
cific methodological problems afoot in insanity defense decisionmak-
256. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824). See Rosenblum, Affinity and Tension in Rela-
tionships Between Social Science and Law, 33 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 1-2 n.1
(1988)[hereinafter Rosenblum, Affinity and Tension]; Rosenblum, A Place for
Social Science Along the Judiciary's Constitutional Law Frontier, 66 Nw. U.L.
REv. 455, 456-457 (1971)[hereinafter Rosenblum, A Place for Social Science].
257. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). See also Colquitt, Judicial Use of Social Science Evidence at
Trial, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 51, 53 (1988). See generally Collins & Friesen, Looking
Back on Muller v. Oregon, 69 A.B.A. J. 294 (1983).
258. Rosenblum, A Place for Social Science, supra note 256, at 457,479 (calling for the
application of social science to judicial decisionmaking "when the courts them-
selves formulate or invoke propositions or norms conditioned upon knowledge
within the competence of the social sciences"). Cf. Loevinger, Law and Science
and Rival Systems, 8 JuRnimErmcs J. 63 (1966)(conflict reflects the law's hostility
toward science as a rival system which would replace the legal, dialectic method).
But see Rosenblum, Affinity and Tension, supra note 256, at 3 (quoting Cottrell,
The Interrelationships of Law and Social Science, in LAw AND THE SOCIAL ROLE
OF SCIENCE 106, 109 (H. Jones ed. 1966)(" 'By and large, the towering ignorance
and indifference on the part of most lawyers concerning the social sciences and
their potentialities is matched only by the abysmal illiteracy and irresponsible
neglect on the part of most so-called social scientists concerning the legal sys-
tem' ").
On the possible roots of the conflict between courts and social scientists, see
Dorin, Two Different Worlds: Criminologists, Justices and Racial Discrimina-
tion in the Imposition of Capital Punishment in Rape Cases, 72 J. CRIM. L. &
CRimiNOLOGY 1667 (1981); Note, Social Science Statistics in the Courtroom: The
Debate Resurfaces in McCleskey v. Kemp, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 688, 708 (1987).
See also Bazelon, Veils, Values and Social Responsibility, 37 AM. PSYcHOLOGIST
115, 117 (1982). For a full exploration of all issues, see Tanford & Tanford, supra
note 28.
259. See Appelbaum, The Empirical Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court, 13 AM. J. L. & MED. 335, 341 (1987)(critiquing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279 (1987) and Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), and charging that the
Supreme Court acts with "blatant wrongheadedness" in dealing with empirical
data in such cases). See also Davis, "There is a Book Out .... " An Analysis of
Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1539 (1987). See gen-
erally M. Perlin, supra note 19.
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ing.260 The law's suspicion of the psychological sciences is well
documented. 26 1 Furthermore, the issues before the courts in insanity
defense cases raise such troubling psychodynamic issues for deci-
sionmakers that the courts' inherent suspicion of the social sciences
will be further heightened.262 Likewise, the history of behavioral
scientists' suspicion of "restrictive legalisms" is well known.263
Historically, one of the earliest criticisms of the law's willful indif-
ference to the question of the application of psychology, was destroyed
by Dean Wigmore in a responsive article that argued that psychology
had nothing to offer the law.264 Because decisions as to sanity clearly
do contain social judgments,265 legal decisionmakers have been overtly
reluctant to cede decisionmaking autonomy in this area to social scien-
tists.266 Although social scientists have now begun to examine the
260. A related exception is the literature that has developed in the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), on the ability
of psychiatrists to accurately predict future dangerousness. See, e.g., Appelbaum,
Death, the E-pert Witness and the Dangers of Going Barefoot, 34 Hosp. & COM-
MUNrTy PSYCHIATRY 1003 (1983); Appelbaum, supra note 259; Appelbaum, The
Supreme Court Looks at Psychiatry, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 827 (1984); Geimer,
Death At Any Cost- A Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat From Its
Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 737 (1985); Perlin, supra note 6,
at 64-66. On the question of the burden of proof at post-insanity acquittal com-
nitment and review hearings, see Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983),
discussed in Perlin, supra note 6, at 66-68 nn.657-65.
261. See, eg., Tanford & Tanford, supra note 28, at 742-46.
262. Sperlich has noted that opposition to the use of social science in the recent past
has explicitly masked political agendas. See, e.g., Sperlich, Social Science Evi-
dence and the Courts: Reaching Beyond the Adversary Process, 63 JuDIcATURE
280, 282 n.9 (1980)(noting that Senator Moynihan's opposition to such use was
grounded on his unhappiness with restrictions on public funding of public educ-
tion and that Amitai Etzioni's opposition was based on his fear that such use
would increase jury acquittals).
263. See generally Bazelon, supra note 258, at 118-19.
264. See Wigmore, The Psychology of Testimony, 3 U. ILL. L. REV. 399 (1909)(respond-
ing to H. MUENSTENBERG, ON THE WrrNESS STAND (1908)). See also H. CARN's,
LAw AND THE SocIAL ScIENcES 169 (1935); Tanford & Tanford, supra note 28, at
744 n.8.
265. Wesson, Historical Truth, Narrative Truth, and Expert Testimony, 60 WASH. L.
REv. 331, 333 (1985). See also Bazelon, supra note 258, at 116 (legal and policy
questions are "multidimensional" because they involve "scientific, moral, and so-
cial judgments").
266. Judge David Bazelon has written revealingly of his "passionate ambivalence"
about the behavioral sciences, an ambivalence reflected in his desire to "open the
courthouse doors" to psychologists and other mental health experts but to "never
hand over the keys." Bazelon, supra note 258, at 115. On the question of the
jurisprudential implications of what non-scientists can contribute to the scientific
community, see Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through the Legal Process, 62
CORNELL L. REv. 817 (1977). See also Wales, The Rise, the Fall, and the Resurrec-
tion of the Medical Model, 63 GEO. L.J. 87 (1974)(Judge Bazelon "invited the
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ways in which insanity judgments are reached,26 7 there still has been
little attention paid to the way courts look at social science research in
insanity defense cases.26 8
3. Toward a Jurisprudence of Social Science?
Some scholars have looked more carefully at the underlying issues
in an effort to create a jurisprudence of social science.26 9 In the most
important work to date, Professors Monahan and Walker have out-
lined a series of specific proposals for obtaining, evaluating, and estab-
lishing in court the findings of empirical, social science research.270
world of mental health professionals and criminologists into his courtroom" to
"extend his courtroom back into the world").
Bazelon's "passionate ambivalence" is discussed in N. FINKEL, supra note 7, at
38-39. In order to understand the depths of Judge Bazelon's ambivalence, it is
necessary to consider the history of the tension in the relationship between social
science and the law. See Rosenblum, Affinity and Tension, supra note 256 at 1.
("Nonperceptions, misperceptions, and dissonance between law and social science
are anything but new in the annals of professional relationships").
267. See, e.g., Homant & Kennedy, Definitions of Mental Illness as a Factor in Expert
Witnesses: Judgments of Insanity, 31 CORRECTIvE & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY J.
BEHAV. TECH. METHODS & THERAPIEs 125 (1985)(some support found for proposi-
tion that one's definition of mental illness correlates with professional back-
ground and ideology and is predictive of attitude toward insanity defense in
general); Homant & Kennedy, Determinants in Expert Witnesses' Opinions in
Insanity Defense Cases, in CouRTs AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EMERGING IssuEs 57
(S. Talerico ed. 1985)(significantly high correlation found between experts' atti-
tudes toward insanity defense in general and judgment of insanity in specific hy-
pothetical case); Homant & Kennedy, Subjective Factors in the Judgment of
Insanity, 14 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 38 (1987)(favorable expert opinion of insanity
defense claim correlated positively with psychiatrist's having liberal ideology).
See also Homant & Kennedy, Subjective Factors in Clinicians' Judgments of In-
sanity: Comparison of a Hypothetical Case and an Actual Case, 18 PROF. Psy-
CHOLOGY: RES. & PRAC. 439 (1987). The universality of the conclusions that can
be drawn from Homant and Kennedy's research is gently questioned in Rogers &
Ewing, supra note 27, at 369.
268. On juror perceptions of expert testimony, see Saks & Wissler, supra note 245.
But see Keilitz, supra note 4, at 291-92 (scholars and practitioners in law and
mental health should look more often to social science research to determine the
effect of the insanity defense).
269. For an earlier and important view, see Katz, The Unmasking of Dishonest Preten-
sions: Toward an Interpretation of the Role of Social Science in Constitutional
Litigation, 6 AM. SOCIOLoGIST 54, 57-58 (1971)(Social scientists subject the argu-
ments for proposed legislation to rigorous analyses in order to identify any logical
or structural weaknesses, factual limitations, erroneous assumptions, or faulty
methodologies).
270. J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note 64; Monahan & Walker, supra note 254;
Walker & Monahan, supra note 254; Walker & Monahan, supra note 51. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hessling, 845 F.2d 617,620,621 n.1 (6th Cir. 1988)(citing Monahan
& Walker, supra note 254, for the proposition that social science research findings
can provide an "invaluable frame of reference" conveyable to a jury).
Both Monahan and Walker are law professors at the University of Virginia.
Walker is a lawyer, and Monahan is a psychologist.
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Noting that all nine members of the Burger Court had either authored
or joined in opinions using social science to establish or criticize a rule
of law,271 they suggest that social science be treated as a source of au-
thority rather than as a source of facts and that social science research
be treated the same way that courts would treat common law legal
precedents.272
Under their recommended schemata, parties should present empir-
ical research in briefs rather than through expert testimony, and
courts should begin to locate social science studies through judges'
own research. Scientific research studies should then be evaluated
along dimensions analogous to those used to evaluate case precedent.
Courts should "place confidence" in scientific research to the extent
that the research has survived critical review by the relevant scientific
community, has employed valid research methods, is generalizable to
the case at issue, and is supported by a body of other research.2 73 If
these guidelines had been employed with any rigor in recent Supreme
Court cases, much of the research relied upon by the Court would be
easily dismissed.274 The ability to comprehend properly conducted re-
271. Monahan & Walker, supra note 254, at 477-78 n.2. Cy. Haney, supra note 93, at
150 ("Many decisions of the Warren court indicated a new openness to social sci-
ence data, suggesting that social scientists would be taken seriously now in a way
that previously they had not been.").
272. Monahan & Walker, supra note 254, at 488. CQ. Bazelon, supra note 266, at 821
n.19.
273. Monahan & Walker, supra note 254, at 495, 499-508.
274. On this point, the authors focus specifically on cases involving numerical compo-
sition of juries. See id. at 510 n.U17 (discussing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
101 (1970), a case in which the Court said there was no discernible difference
between six and twelve member juries). See also Saks, Ignorance of Science Is No
Excuse, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 18 (Court's empirical scholarship "would not
win a passing grade in a high school psychology test"); Zeisel & Diamond, "Con-
vincing Empirical Evidence"on the Six Member Jury, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 281,292
(1974)(studies' flaws are "not complex and surely not beyond the reach of modest
expertise"). See generally Baldwin & McConville, Criminal Juries, in 2 CRIME
AND JUSICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE REsEARCH 269 (N. Morris & M. Tonry
eds. 1980)(all empirical research on non-unanimous and smaller-than-twelve ju-
ries is flawed by severe methodological limitations; but "faulty interpretation of
research" is an even more important problem).
Criticisms of the Supreme Court's reluctance to accept certain statistical data
has since resurfaced following its decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, 418 U.S. 279
(1987)(rejecting statistics and results of a social science survey-the "Baldus
Study"-offered to show systemic racial discrimination in Georgia prosecutors'
decision to seek death penalty and in state's juries' decisions to sentence defend-
ant to death based on victim's race). See, eg., Amsterdam, Race and the Death
Penalty, 7 CRiM. JusT. ETmcs 2 (1988)("the basic principles that give value to our
lives [that] are in the keeping of the law... have been sold down the river");
Kennedy, supra note 98, at 1389 (majority "repressed the truth and validated ra-
cially oppressive official conduct"); The Supreme Court 1986 Term - Leading
Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 158 (1987)(McCleskey is "logically unsound, mor-
ally reprehensible, and legally unsupportable"); Note, McCleskej v. Kemp: Coin-
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search studies should be well within the grasp of lawyers and judges.
After all, "anyone who can comprehend the Federal Tort Claims Act
can learn what standard deviation and statistical significance
means."275
According to Monahan and Walker, general conclusions from so-
cial science research can be used to determine factual issues in a spe-
cific case through the device of "social frameworks." After the court
evaluates the applicable research, it is to be communicated to the jury
by instruction in the same manner as the court explains the pertinent
case law and statutes.276 The court's instructions should involve four
components: (1) the factual determination that is being framed or
placed in context for the jury by the research; (2) the variables in the
research that bear upon the determination the jury is to make; (3) the
form of the relationship that exists between the identified factors; and
(4) the magnitude of the relationship that is to be addressed in the
empirical framework.277 Such a new methodology would be efficient
and inexpensive and would be specifically helpful where the relevant
empirical research provides uncommon and otherwise unavailable in-
sights into factual issues at trial. Here, "knowledge of certain topics
... appears not to be common among lay factfinders, and what passes
for knowledge in other areas may be bogus."278
ing Full Circle: A Return to Arbitrary Sentencing Patterns in Capital
Punishment Cases, 56 UMKC L. REv. 387 (1988).
The Court's hostility in McCleskey may have been presaged by Justice Pow-
ell's concurrence in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 246 (1978)(anything smaller
than a six person jury would be unconstitutional in state criminal trial)(wisdom
and the necessity of relying on statistical studies is questionable). But see Kerr,
supra note 254, at 61 (applauding Blackmun's "extensive and sophisticated use"
of social science research in majority opinion). Some of the problems with the
McCleskey position are similarly presaged in Ellsworth & Ross, Public Opinion
and Judicial Decisionmaking: An Example From Research in Capital Punish-
ment, in CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNrrED STATEs 152, 166 (H. Bedau & C.
Pierce eds. 1976) (problems of "critical evaluation"). See also Harris v. Pulley, 852
F.2d 1546 (9th Cir. 1988)(statistical study suggesting that application of Califor-
nia's death penalty statute results in discriminatory imposition of death sentences
upon defendants convicted of murdering whites and among young males does not
provide basis for finding statute violates equal protection clause or prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment).
275. Monahan & Walker, supra note 254, at 511 n.119. See generally Lochner, Some
Limits on the Application of Social Science Research in the Legal Process, 5 LAw
& Soc. ORD. 815 (1973). On why courts are distrustful of statistical evidence, see
Note, supra note 258, at 705-08. For an empirical evaluation of how such evidence
is interpreted, see Thompson & Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence
in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney's Fallacy,
11 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 167 (1987).
276. Walker & Monahan, supra note 51, at 570, 585, 592.
277. Id. at 595. See generally Walker & Monahan, supra note 254 (explaining how the
authors would construe scientific methodology as legal precedent).
278. Walker & Monahan, supra note 51, at 579-84. The examples given by the authors
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The insanity defense myths are precisely this type of "bogus,"
"common" knowledge upon which our jurisprudence is based. Based
upon OCS and such heuristic reasoning devices as the vividness effect
and availability, they reflect views of crime and mental illness based
on fundamentalist and medieval religiosity, scholasticism, supersti-
tion, and the alleged relationships between mental illness and "sin."279
They assume a fixed-world data base of human behavior, and an all-
or-nothing view of mental illness and criminal responsibility. Until
we seriously consider the value of a methodology of the sort outlined
by Monahan and Walker, we will continue to remain imprisoned by
these distorted views.
4. The Psychodynamics of Judicial Suspicion
Courts remain profoundly suspicious of much social science evi-
dence.280 The roots of this suspicion most likely stem from multiple
causes. Like the judicial process, social science is normative and
value-driven. 2s1 Further, judges' pre-existing social values and views
taint their perceptions of the probative value of social science data.282
Judges may view social science as a competitor for the judge's histori-
cal role as society's "primary intellectual broker."283 In addition, we
fear that social science may introduce complexities that shake the
judge's confidence in imposed solutions.2 "4
Courts respond negatively to social science data even to the extent
focus upon research into factors affecting the accuracy of eyewitness testimony
and the battered woman's syndrome.
279. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 625-28; M. Perlin, supra note 2.
280. See generally McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). For an earlier view in an
insanity defense case, see People v. Nash, 52 Cal. 2d 36, 338 P.2d 416, 424
(1959)("There is danger in judicial changes of long-established rules of law when
such changes proceed from a court's assumption that it can recognize what has
become a fact of social science"). Not even the most eminent of scholars are im-
mune from statistics-bashing. See Tribe, supra note 53, at 1329 ("Yesterday's
practice of numerology has given way to today's theory of probability, currently
the sine qua non of rational analysis"). Tribe is responded to carefully in Saks &
Kidd, supra note 45. See also supra Part H C.
281. See Woolhandler, supra note 142, at 119 (discussing G. MYRbAL, AN AMERICAN
DnLEMA 92 (1944)). See also Berk, The Role of Subjectivity in Criminal Justice
Cayication and Prediction Methods, 7 CRIM. JusT. ETH. 35 (1988). Compare
Bazelon, supra note 258, at 120-21.
282. Woolhandler, supra note 142, at 120. See also id. at 118 n.47 (statistical showing in
McC/eskey was "outweighed by majoritarian preferences for retribution and as-
sumed deterrence, and the need for discretion in the administering of the crimi-
nal justice system").
283. Kerr, supra note 254, at 71 (citing P. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL
SCMENCE (1972)).
284. Woolhandler, supra note 142, at 125 n.84 (quoting D. HoROwrrz, supra note 254,
at 284). Social science is thus relied upon by advocates in their efforts to persuade
the court only as a "last resort." Kerr, supra note 254, at 66 (citing Haney, supra
note 93).
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of suggesting there is something faintly supernatural or fictive at its
basis28 5 because such evidence is often dissonant with the judges' own
OCS.286 Just as Chief Justice Rehnquist has delineated his vision of
"abnormal" mental behavior in Wainwright v. Greenfield 287 and Ake
v. Oklahoma,288 and as he has trivialized scientific discourse on jury
bias cases,28 9 other judges debase social science research and data. 29 0
When the Court in Jones v. United States rejected petitioner's argu-
ment that available research "fail[ed] to support the predictive value
of prior dangerous acts," the Court did so by simply responding: "We
do not agree with the suggestion that Congress' power to legislate in
this area depends on the research conducted by the psychiatric com-
munity."291 In response to the further argument that it was unreason-
able for Congress to determine that an insanity acquittal "supports an
inference of continuing mental illness," it merely concluded without
citation or reference: "It comports with common sense to conclude
that someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to com-
mit a criminal act is likely to remain ill and in need of treatment.292
Cases such as Jones may simply reveal that the Supreme Court's
use of social science data is only teleological.293 Several scholars have
argued that individual justices employ an outcome-determinative ap-
proach, uncritically accepting social science data bolstering opinions
when they are in the majority, but debunking it when they are in the
285. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223,246 (1978)(Powell, J., concurring)(criticizing reli-
ance on "numerology" of statistical studies).
286. Sherwin, supra note 85, at 737. See, e.g., Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 217, at
4 (courts demonstrate a "marked aversion to information about how due process
works in practice in contrast to theory... because the operational evidence con-
tinues to contradict the rosy future the court predicted for capital [punishment]
schemes").
287. 474 U.S. 284 (1986). See Perlin, supra note 1, at 725-26.
288. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). See Perlin, supra note 1, at 718.
289. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 160, 166-68 (1986)("death qualification" of
jury does not violate constitutional right to impartial trial). See also Kerr, supra
note 254, at 63 (Rehnquist relied on social science less frequently than any other
justices in study sample); Tanford & Tanford, supra note 28, at 774 n.224 (Rehn-
quist's opinion was "an excellent example of how lay persons tend to reject scien-
tific knowledge in favor of folklore and traditional ignorance").
290. The same attitude infects the lower courts as well. See Kennedy, supra note 98,
at 1400 n.45 (discussing remand trial court opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp, No.
C87-1517A at 12 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 1987), where the court stated that racial dis-
parities found in the Baldus study were produced by arbitrarily structured
"rinky-dink" regressions that accounted for only a few variables. 'They prove
nothing other than the truth of the adage that anything may be proved by
statistics").
291. 463 U.S. 354, 364-65 n.13 (1983).
292. Id. at 366 (emphasis added). Jones had been charged with attempted petit larceny
(shoplifting). Id. at 359.
293. See Appelbaum, supra note 259, at 341 (discussing Perlin, supra note 6, at 71).
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minority.294 To an important extent, heuristic reasoning may help ex-
plain this behavior. Attribution theory teaches when the import of a
body of data is contrary to a justice's otherwise-articulated or deeply-
held views the tendency to discount such data must at times be diffi-
cult to resist.2 95 Thus, members of the court bypass substantial bodies
of data and substitute bits of inconclusive data that reflect their own
findings of substantiality.296 Until the heuristic roots of the justices'
positions are acknowledged, it is unlikely that recommendations such
as those suggested by Monahan and Walker will have a significant im-
pact on how courts evaluate social science data.
D. The Psychodynamics of Judicial Attitudes
Any investigation of insanity defense jurisprudence from the per-
spective of psychodynamic factors must include an examination of the
peculiar psychodynamics involved in judicial decisionmaking. Judges
are not impervious to the non-reflective, heuristic, irrational thought
processes that are emblematic of the public's attitudes towards the in-
sanity defense.2 97 Further attention must be paid to two overlapping
questions: (1) what signals are judges, in particular Supreme Court
Justices, currently giving in this area; and (2) why are they responding
in this manner?298
294. Kerr, supra note 254, at 58 (quoting P. ROsEN, supra note 283, at 90) (when courts
wish to uphold social welfare measures, they generally accept the validity of facts
contained in '"Brandeis briefs," but whenever they choose to reject such legisla-
tion, courts find extralegal data unconvincing).
295. Appelbaum, supra note 259, at 347.
296. Rosenblum, Affinity and Tension, supra note 256, at 15. -
297. For a view of the type of unconscious factors that may animate appellate court
decisionmaking, see Amsterdam, supra note 98, at 792. On judicial behavior in
this context, see Note, The Appearance of Justice: Judges' Verbal and Nonverbal
Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89 (1985). But see Myers,
Social Background and the Sentencing Behavior of Judges, 26 CRiMNOLOGY 649,
668 (1988)(judicial background has little direct bearing on sentencing outcomes;
its effect is more "subtle and indirect, discernible only after considering social
background in conjunction with the offender's attributes and behaviors").
In responding to the suggestion that psychoanalytic discourse could be profita-
bly used "as a hermeneutic to disclose the individual offender to himself and the
judge," Kaplan and Rinella stated that such a stance assumes a judge is "capable
of sympathy, psychological subtlety, and self-awareness. It further assumes a pol-
icy where prejudice of race or class does not distort the administration of criminal
justice." Kaplan & Rinella, Jurisprudence and the Appropriation of the Psycho-
analytic. A Study in Ideology and Form, 11 INT'L J. L. & PsYcHIATRY 215, 227
(1988).
298. For an analysis of the importance of justices' deeply held beliefs about where
constitutional decision-making power should be located, see Kahn, The Intersec-
tion of Polity and Rights Principles on the Burger Court: Towards a Social Sci-
ence of Jurisprudence, 11 LEGAL STUD. F. 5 (1987).
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1. Justices' Signals
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions in cases involving mentally dis-
abled criminal defendants reflect a fixed, unidimensional vision of the
sort of externalities which must be present if such disability is to be an
exculpatory defense.299 His views are similar to those expressed by
Justices Black and Harlan in their Pate v. Robinson dissent.300 They
incorporate a kind of "ordinary common sense-icality" and reject the
notion that a defendant who does not conform to the notion of a mad-
man who jumps over chairs in the courtroom,3 01 who is not a "raving
maniac," or who is not a "complete imbecile," 302 can avail himself of
the insanity defense.3 0 3
While there is a robust literature both by and about Justice Rehn-
quist on the chief justice's philosophy, scant attention has been paid to
the issues discussed in this article.304 One irony should be fairly clear.
While Rehnquist is severe in his extrajudicial writings about judges
who inappropriately elevate their own personal moral judgments to
the level of law,3 05 he falls into precisely this trap in his opinions; his
decisions concerning mentally disabled criminal defendants are in-
formed by his own view of OCS.306
Much has been written about how this court is aggressively
majoritarian (or at least "nonminoritarian"), seeing the Constitution
"through the eyes of mainline America," via means that are "insensi-
299. See supra Part III C. See also Perlin, supra note 1, at 718-30 (discussing Rehn-
quist's opinions in cases involving mentally disabled criminal defendants). Cf.
Quen, Anglo-American Criminal Insanity: A Historical Perspective, 2 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PsYCHIATRY & L. 115, 120 (1974).
300. 383 U.S. 375 (1966). In Robinson, the Supreme Court found that criminal incom-
petency-to-stand-trial proceedings were governed by the due process clause. In
the dissent, Justices Harlan and Black focused on the defendant's "behavior in
the courtroom as evidencing competency." Id. at 387, 390. See also Lynch v. Over-
holser, 369 U.S. 705, 715 (1962)(discouraging false pleas of insanity).
301. Bromberg & Cleckley, supra note 126.
302. Jones v. State, 289 So. 2d 725, 729 (Fla. 1974).
303. See Quen, supra note 299.
304. See, e.g., Denvir, Justice Rehnquist and Constitutional Interpretation, 34 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1011, 1032, 1040 (1987)(arguing that Rehnquist's conception of the
"majoritarian system of government" can best be understood by the construct of
an "individualism/paternalism model"). For a more detailed discussion of Rehn-
quist's opinions, see Perlin, supra note 6.
305. See, e.g., Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv. 693, 704
(1976).
306. This contradiction has been noted in the context of other subject matter areas.
See Riggs & Proffitt, The Judicial Philosophy of Justice Rehnquist, 16 AKRON L.
REV. 555, 565 (1983); Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist. A Preliminary View, 90
HARv. L. REV. 293, 332 (1976)(in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974),
Rehnquist "sacrificed reasoned analysis to his determination that the [defend-
ant's] conviction for mailing obscene and manifestly distasteful materials be af-
firmed"). However, commentators have been virtually silent as it applies to this
population. See generally Sherwin, supra note 85.
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tive, or at least unempathetic, to those most in need of its protec-
tion."307 This majoritarianismos is reflected in the Court's disposition
of cases arising in a variety of fact settings, including civil actions seek-
ing to reform institutions for the mentally disabled and criminal ap-
peals dealing with burdens of proof in commitment and release
hearings following insanity defense acquittals.3 09
Such aggressive majoritarianism is marked by a "willful deafness,"
a "willful refusal to listen to the contentions of the party [the Court] is
ruling against."31 0 In a telling description of the Court's deafness in
search and seizure litigation, Professor Finer uses a psychodynamic
metaphor to make his point:
To listen is to maintain a state of relatively open-minded, alert, intellectu-
ally active receptivity toward all non-frivolous contentions. While justices
cannot be expected to hear with the value neutrality once expected of psycho-
analysts, they can with effort approach the "evenly suspended attention"
Freud recommended to psychoanalysts "in the face of all that one hears. .. "
On the contrary, judges can approach a hearing (and read a brief) as some-
thing more than a formality, or worse, an inconvenience on the path to ulti-
mate conscious or subconscious imposition of their psychologica4 social,
economic or moral preconceptions....
It is active listening that is a prerequisite to just judging.311
To what extent, if at all, do members of the current Court engage
in such "active listening," and to what extent do they merely impose
their preexisting psychological preconceptions?3' 2 While a full-scale
psychoanalytic interpretation of the justices is far beyond the scope of
this article, those justices who sat on the Burger Court 313 have emitted
certain signals in cases involving mentally disabled criminal defend-
307. Stone, O.T. 1983 and the Era of Aggressive Majoritarianism: A Court in Transi-
tion, 19 GA. L. REv. 15, 19, 22 (1984).
308. See Perlin, supra note 218, at 1258 (discussing the majoritarian implications of
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), which consid-
ered the eleventh amendment jurisdictional limitation on actions brought in fed-
eral court against state officials based on state law).
309. E.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). See also
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 97 & 291. Cf. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1
(1981)(no private cause of action under Developmentally Disabled Assistance
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1988)).
310. Finer, supra note 168, at 205 (emphasis in original). See also Appelbaum, supra
note 259, at 345 (explaining Court's decision in McCleskey as function of its fear
that if it accepted the arguments as to racial disparities in death penalty imposi-
tion, "future studies might show other 'unexplained discrepancies' in sentencing
patterns that might require restructuring the entire sentencing process").
311. Finer, supra note 168, at 205-06 (emphasis added). "Active listening" is discussed
extensively in D. BmDER & S. PRICE, supra note 58, at 25-37.
312. See, eg., Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of the Trial Judge's Decision-Mak-
ing, 39 MERcER L. REv. 937, 945 (1988)(how the judge perceives attorneys' argu-
ments and measures them against his values will influence how he decides and
how he feels about his decision).
313. Justice Kennedy is currently completing his first full term on the court. While
1990]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ants which partially reveal their "fit" in a "willful deafness" model.314
Four justices - Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun consistently,
and Stevens generally - have articulated positions that are sympa-
thetic to the plight of the mentally disabled criminal defendant. They
are suspicious of overblown claims of psychiatric expertise, especially
in matters dealing with the predictability of dangerousness; they ap-
pear willing to engage in "active listening" in cases involving the men-
tally disabled. Exemplars of this willingness include Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Barefoot v. Estelle,3s 5 Justice Brennan's dissent
Justice Scalia has already participated in two terms' decisions, that experience
has generated an insufficient data base to include him fairly in this section.
But see supra text accompanying notes 110-22, discussing the OCS-implica-
tions of Justice Scalia's opinion in Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988). However,
Justice Scalia's early dissent in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), in which
the Court held that the introduction of a "Victim Impact Statement" at the sen-
tencing phase of a capital case violated the eighth amendment may have revealed
his future directions in cases involving mentally disabled criminal defendants:
Many citizens have found one-sided and hence unjust the criminal
trial in which a parade of witnesses comes forth to testify to the pres-
sures of beyond normal human experience that drove the defendant to
commit his crime, with no one to lay before the sentencing authority the
full reality of human suffering the defendant has produced - which
(and not moral guilt alone) is one of the reasons society deems his act
worthy of the prescribed penalty. Perhaps these sentiments do not suffi-
ciently temper justice with mercy, but there is a question to be decided
through the democratic processes of a free people, and not by the decree
of this Court. There is nothing in the Constitution that dictates the an-
swer, no more in the field of capital punishment than elsewhere.
Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original). See also Penry v. Lynaugh,
109 S. Ct. 2934, 2968 (1989)(Scalia, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part)(majority's view expanding admissibility of mental retardation as mitigating
evidence on question of defendant's moral culpability reflects "an unguided, emo-
tional 'moral response' ... an unfocused sympathy"), discussed in 3 M. PERLIN,
supra note 9, at 83-84, at 617.10 (1990 pocket part).
314. Much of the material infra accompanying notes 315-36 is adapted from Perlin,
supra note 6, at 81-83. See also Rosenberg, Activism Without Equality, in THE
BURGER YEARS 125, 139 (H. Schwartz ed. 1987)(discussing Burger Court's track
record in cases involving mentally disabled civil litigants, concluding that while
it is by no means clear that the Burger Court chose to overtly "target" the men-
tally disabled, the attitudes of a majority of the justices reveal, an "insistence on
judicial passivity [which] left the legitimate and urgent claims of mentally dis-
abled people at the mercy of those who prefer them to be out of sight and out of
mind").
Justices' views are also reflected in related decisions. Compare Justice White's
opinion in Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988)(§ 504 of Rehabilitation Act of
1973 not violated by Veterans' Administration's characterization of alcoholism as
"willful misconduct" for purposes of 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1)), with Justice Black-
mun's opinion in Traynor. Id. at 1382-83.
315. 463 U.S. 880 (1983)(psychiatric testimony in punishment phase of capital case as
to future dangerousness permissible even where witness never personally ex-




in Jones v. United States,316 Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Ake
v. Oklahoma,3 17 and Justice Stevens' dissent in Allen v. Illinois.3 1 8
The other five justices who have typically made up the majority in
cases where the claims of a mentally disabled defendant were rejected
such as in Allen, Jones, and Barefoot, have not approached the cases so
uniformly. The faith expressed by Justice White in Barefoot in the
jury's ability to separate the "wheat from the chaff"319 enabled him to
sanction the admission of expert testimony as to future dangerousness
in a capital case in spite of overwhelming professional agreement that
in a "best-case analysis" the types of psychiatric predictions relied
upon by the state would be wrong two out of three times.320
Justice Powell showed his willingness to expand earlier opinions
sanctioning fewer safeguards for certain populations 32 ' in compe-
tence-to-be-executed decisions in Ford v. Wainwright 322 and commit-
ment and release hearings for insanity acquittees in Jones v. United
States.323 Justice O'Connor has expressed fear that the court's deci-
sion in Ford will inspire other defendants to feign insanity in last-ditch
316. 463 U.S. 354 (1983). See also id. at 371 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(fact of insanity
acquittal not constitutionally valid substitute for due process protections); Penry
v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2961 (1989)(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part)(impairment of mentally retarded offender's reasoning abilities
and moral development limits culpability so as to preclude imposition of death
penalty).
317. 470 U.S. 68 (1985)(indigent criminal defendant who makes ex parte threshold
showing has right to expert assistance in presenting insanity defense).
318. 478 U.S. 364 (1986)(privilege against self-incrimination inapplicable in sex offend-
ers' proceedings). See id. at 375 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(procedures should be
deemed criminal in nature, and fifth amendment should apply).
319. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 n.7 (1983).
320. Id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In relying on J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47-49 (1981), the state's expert witness at
Barefoot's habeas hearing had conceded that Monahan was the "leading thinker"
at work in this area today. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899-900 n.7 (1983). A
recent article asserts: "[We have yet to find a single word of praise for, or in
defense of, Barefoot in the literature of either science or law." Risinger,
Denbeaux & Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge:
The Lessons of Handwriting Identifimation "M'xpertse"% 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731,
780, n.215 (1989). -
321. E.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 497 (1980)(Powell, J., concurring)(scope of
prison inmates' right to assistance at transfer-to-mental-hospital hearing);
Parham v. J.R, 442 U.S. 584 (1979)(juveniles).
322. 477 U.S. 399 (1986)(eighth amendment prohibits execution of insane prisoner).
See id. at 418, 426 (Powell, J., concurring)(the ordinary adversarial process that
includes live testimony, cross-examination, and oral argument by counsel may
not necessarily be the best means of arriving at appropriate judgments regarding
a defendant's sanity).
323. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363-64 (1983)(defendant's concession
of having committed a criminal act (shoplifting) provides "concrete evidence" as
to his dangerousness that is generally as persuasive as predictions about danger-
ousness regularly made in civil commitment proceedings).
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efforts to cheat death.324
Perfectly mirroring the community's OCS,325 former Chief Justice
Burger remained overwhelmingly ambivalent and offered a wide
range of positions. After he authored Estelle v. Smith,326 which ex-
panded Miranda and raised the issue of psychiatric expertise in dan-
gerousness predictivity problems, he concurred in Ake to limit its
application to capital cases and was the sole member of the court to
join in Justice Rehnquist's Ford dissent.327
Chief Justice Rehnquist's implacability and his crystallized posi-
tions are clear. His concurring opinions urging limitations in Estelle
and Wainwright v. Greenfleld 328 reveal a vision of mental disability
that virtually mirror public perceptions. In Greenfield, Rehnquist fo-
cused explicitly on the fact that when the defendant was given his Mi-
randa warnings, he was not "incoherent or obviously confused or
unbalanced."3 29 In other words, the defendant was not "crazy" be-
cause he did not "look" crazy.33 0 As the lone dissenter in Ake, Rehn-
quist expressed concerns of feigning3 3 ' in the face of staggeringly
unanimous professional diagnosis and lay observation as to the profun-
dity of Ake's mental illness.3 32 In his Ford dissent, in addition to re-
jecting the argument that the eighth amendment applied to the
324. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 429 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part)(potential for false claims "obviously enormous").
In her opinion in Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989), Justice O'Connor
supported her position that mental retardation per se should not serve as a com-
plete bar on capital punishment by noting that the insanity defense serves to pro-
tect the severely retarded from conviction and punishment. Id. at 2954. This
assertion ignores the inadequate assistance of counsel frequently present in in-
sanity defense cases. See, e.g., Alvord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956, 957-63
(1984)(Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), discussed in 3 M. PER-
LIN, supra note 9, at 352-53, at § 15.23.
325. See Morse, supra note 10, at 795 (discussing the "ambivalence with which society
views crazy criminals"). But see Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will and the Law of
Confessions, 65 VA. L. REv. 859, 901 n.210 (1979)("[1]aw does not simply mirror
societal expectations and attitudes; it prescribes the standards and obligations
that individuals in society must accept").
326. 451 U.S. 454 (1981)(constitutionally impermissible for witness appointed by court
to determine defendant's competency to testify on state's behalf at penalty phase
as to defendant's likely future dangerousness).
327. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985)(Burger, C.J., concurring); Ford v. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 399, 431 (1986)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See infra text accom-
panying note 335.
328. 474 U.S. 284 (1986).
329. Id. at 297 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
330. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 724-27. Similar reasoning is reflected in the trial testi-
mony of State v. Clayton, 656 S.W.2d 344, 350-51 (Tenn. 1983)(against an array of
overwhelming evidence of defendant's insanity, "jurors chose to accept testimony
of police officers who characterized defendant as 'look[ing] okay to me' and as
'show[ing] remorse' in that 'he got kind of teary-eyed' ").
331. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 90-91 (1985)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
332. For a full discussion of the facts of Ake, see Perlin, supra note 6, at 18-22. For the
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execution of the insane, he again raised the specter of sane capitally-
sentenced defendants who sought to cheat death by raising spurious,
multiple claims of insanity.333 In Colorado v. Connell), a case ruling
that absent police coercion, severe mental disability was not a relevant
issue in construing the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, Rehnquist
criticized a lower court for "importing into this area-of constitutional
law notions of 'free will' that have no place there."334
2. Judicial Philosophies
Why do the justices respond in this manner? Are the mentally
handicapped a specific judicial target?-5 What impels the justices' de-
cisions? On one level, the justices' methodologies may be seen as a
reflection of a philosophy that demands that all judicial decisionmak-
ing take place on a rational, conscious level.336 Such a philosophy is
seen most notably in the opinions of Warren Burger (as developed
during his years on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals) and of
the New Jersey Supreme Court when Joseph Weintraub was its Chief
Justice.
Both Burger and Weintraub expressed "ordinary commonsense" 33 7
visions of criminal defendants as "normal, rational human 'beings"
who can and should be held accountable or responsible for their be-
most recent scholarship on malingering, see Symposium, Malingering and Decep-
tion: An Update, 8 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 1-102 (1990).
333. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 435 (1986)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
334. 479 U.S. 157,169 (emphasis added). See generally Benner, Requiem for Miranda=
The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67
WASH. U.L.Q. 59 (1989); Perlin, Colorado v. Connelly: Farewell to Free Will? 14
SEARCH & SEiZURE L. REP. 121 (1987); Perlin, supra note 1, at 729-30.
335. See Rosenberg, supra note 314, at 139 (although one might want to accuse the
Court of being insensitive, 'handicapped people are obviouily not the Court's tar-
get"). Rosenberg analyzed only the court's civil docket, which included cases
such as Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)(right to treatment of institution-
alized mentally handicapped); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1 (1981); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)(burden of proof at civil
commitment hearing). It is unclear if Rosenberg would have exempted the court
from being callous if his analysis had been expanded to cases involving-mentally
disabled criminal defendants.
336. See, eg., State v. Andrews, 187 Kan. 458, 469, 357 P.2d 739, 747 (1960):
It may be noted, that Freudian psychiatrists tend to discount the exist-
ence of the capacity in the individual to exercise his free will. Perhaps, it
should be noted also that there are other schools of psychiatry besides
the Freudian. It is not for the lawyer to decide between these schools.
We can only wish all of these learned men success in their quest for
knowledge in a new field. But, the law has always insisted upon an exer-
cise of the will.
337. See Sherwin, supra note 85, at 749-56. But see Grano, supra note 325, at 890 ("a
relativistic approach, based on introspective moral judgments, is not what we
should expect in constitutional analysis by the Supreme Court").
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havior.338 This premise 39 is one rooted in centuries of experience and
which has not been undermined by contemporary medical knowl-
edge.340 To discard it would require adoption of a psychiatric model
whose inevitable thrust would be to "discard all concepts of insanity as
a defense . . . and to deal with all transgressors as unfortunate
mortals."341 According to Justice Francis's famous dictum in State v.
Sikora, criminal responsibility "must be judged at the level of the con-
scious."342 This rejection of psychodynamics and a psychodynamic
means of decisionmaking343 permeates recent Supreme Court deci-
sionmaking and reflects what the Rehnquist years will most likely
bring.344
As discussed earlier, there is a profound judicial tradition endors-
ing a draconian, Old Testament rule of punishment in criminal cases.
While we no longer adhere to the words of a turn-of-the-century deci-
sion of a West Virginia appellate judge that the "morality of our laws
is the morality of the Mosaic interpretation of the Ten Command-
ments, modified only as to the degree and kind of punishment in-
flicted,"345 the animating principles behind a "just deserts" theory of
punishment are fairly similar.
Justice Rehnquist may be expressing no more than a view com-
338. See, eg., Keys v. United States, 346 F.2d 824,826 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert denied, 382
U.S. 869 (1965).
339. See Haney, supra note 93, at 172 (characterizing such beliefs as a "legal fiction").
340. Eule, supra note 195, at 695-96.
341. State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 84, 152 A.2d 50, 75 (1959)(Weintraub, C.J., concur-
ring)(emphasis in original). See also Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 865
(D.C. Cir. 1961)(Burger, J., concurring)('lhile philosophers, theologians, scien-
tists and lawyers have debated for centuries whether such a thing as 'free will'
really exists," we really have no choice in the matter. We must proceed, until a
firm alternative is available, on "the scientifically unprovable assumption that
human beings make choices in the regulation of their conduct").
The "vividness" heuristic, discussed supra text accompanying notes 47-50, also
informs Burger's jurisprudence. In In re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C.
1957), over the course of a weekend, forensic hospital officials indicated that, con-
trary to prior practice, "psychopathic personality" would be classified as a
"mental disease." Rosenfleld's impact on subsequent insanity developments is
highlighted in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 977-78 (D.C. Cir.
1972)(adopting ALI test), overruling Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954)("product" test).
342. 44 N.J. 453, 470, 210 A.2d 193, 202 (1965).
343. See supra note 218 (discussing Justice (then-Judge) Burger's opinion dissenting
on rehearing in Pea v. United States, 397 F.2d 627, 638, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
344. Cf. Haney, supra note 93, at 193 ("Like the rest of us, judges, legislators and law-
yers are 'naive psychologists' who often use imperfect and inadequate informa-
tion to make attributions about people and behavior"). Id. at 193 n.95 (criticizing
the Supreme Court's "disturbing endorsement of naive psychologizing by trial
judges" in sentencing decisions such as United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41
(1978)).
345. Moore v. Strickling, 33 S.E. 274, 278 (W. Va. 1899).
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porting with "conventional morality"3 46 - the public perceives notori-
ous insanity defense defendants to be engaged in "morally distasteful"
behavior.3 47 In such cases, judges appear to endorse the implicit exist-
ence of a "community tolerance threshold"m48 where the community,
through the jury, "projects its own feelings upon the accused," and
where the jury "fairly well reflects the state of the public mind."349
IV. CONCLUSION
The results of the relevant jury research data and the status of so-
cial science evidence in the courts can be explained when they are
viewed through the filters of ordinary common sense and heuristic
reasoning. Social science data is trivialized where it does not "fit" into
prereflective OCS thought, and its importance is minimized through
reliance on heuristics. Just as acceptance of the Baldus study in Mc-
Ceskey v. Kemp might have required "restructuring the entire sen-
tencing process,"3 5 0 so might acceptance of rational and coherent
social science frameworks 35 1 require courts to abandon their adher-
ence to both the empirical myths and social meta-myths that continue
to inform our insanity defense jurisprudence. Cases such as Jones v.
United States reflect the way that OCS will continue to "trump" social
science. Pertinent jury research demonstrates the power of heuristic
fallacies to insanity decisionmakers. The opinions of Supreme Court
justices reflect the same reasoning errors and the same unconscious
reification of OCS principles.
These influences were exaggerated even more in the wake of the
HinckZey acquittal. In such a case, it is more likely that the public will
refuse to believe that the assassination attempt could truly have been
346. See Sadurski, supra note 144, at 351-56.
347. Note, Still Newer Equal Protection: Impermissible Purpose Review in the 1984
Term, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 1454, 1477 (1986). See, e.g., Steadman & Cocozza, Selec-
tive Reporting and the Public's Misconceptions of the Criminally Insane, 41 PuB.
OpiN. Q. 523 (1977-78)(public inaccurately assumed that defendants such as
Charles Manson and David Berkowitz ("Son of Sam") had pled the insanity
defense).
348. Boehnert, supra note 144, at 228. Professor Boehnert uses this phrase to describe
jurors' implicit decisionmaking processes in insanity defense cases. For a debate
over the significance of such a level of community tolerance, see Hall, The In-
sanity Defense: Thumbs Down to Wexler's "Offense-Victim"Limitation, 27 ARiz.
L. REV. 329 (1985); Wexler, supra note 178; Wexler, The "Offense-Victim" In-
sanity Limitation4 A Reoinder, 27 ARiz. L. REV. 335 (1985). See also Perlin,
supra note 1, at 704-06.
349. W. WHrrE, supra note 194, at 91, 188.
350. Appelbaum, supra note 259, at 345.




the result of mental illness.52 The intense amount of publicity such
cases receive in the news media brings with it an inevitably distorting
and heuristic effect,3 53 creating a distinctive kind of hydraulic pres-
sure based on outraged public opinion.354
The sentiments of fear, revulsion, skepticism, and anger that regu-
larly follow insanity acquittals will be heightened where the putative
victim is a public figure. Society's deep-seeded and rarely-articulated
ambivalence about punishment, its projection of unacceptable hostile
impulses onto an insanity-pleading defendant and its unconscious
fears of its own impulses 355 exaggerates its response to a "political"
case in which OCS and heuristic devices dominate and the likelihood
of reasoned discourse is lessened. Because trials involving public
figures are inherently "hard cases,"356 there may be an extra level of
distortion. Juries may be too frightened of the hard case, and the
judge may be too frightened of the bad law that is bound to result.
These fears reflect eternal conflict between law in the abstract and
the justice of the case.35 7
When the power of OCS and the pervasiveness of heuristic reason-
ing devices are considered and understood, the reasons for the post-
Hinckley insanity defense shrinkage become clear.358 In the context
of a case involving a defendant about whom "everybody [was] morally
convinced [that he was] conscious and aware of what he did,"39 we
erroneously attribute representativeness to the most vivid case that
provides us with the most available anecdotes upon which we superim-
pose an illusion of validity. It is no wonder that, in the light of our
employment of these powerful simplifying devices, our insanity de-
fense remains in gridlock. Until we come to terms with the power and
dominance of OCS and heuristics and acknowledge their existence
and their omnipresence, our efforts to formulate a reflective, inte-
grated, and rational jurisprudence of the insanity defense will remain
doomed.
352. Diamond, Isaac Ray and the Trial of Daniel M'Naghten, 112 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
651, 655 (1956).
353. See Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, supra note 50.
354. R. Christiansen, supra note 24, at 46.
355. See, e.g., Schoenfeld, Law and Unconscious Motivation, 8 How. L.J. 15, 17
(1962)(it is not surprising that apprehension and punishment of criminals helps
direct the "unconscious aggressive tendencies" of policemen and prison officials
into "socially useful channels").
356. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 20 (constitutional law defines itself through reaction to
"great cases").
357. P. DEVLIN, supra note 20, at 124.
358. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 636-40.
359. See R. MORAN, supra note 27, at 21.
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